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Abstract
This paper tests financial contagion due to interbank linkages. For identification we exploit 
an idiosyncratic, sudden shock caused by a large-bank failure in conjunction with detailed 
data on interbank exposures. First, we find robust evidence that higher interbank exposure 
to the failed bank leads to large deposit withdrawals. Second, the magnitude of contagion is 
higher for banks with weaker fundamentals. Third, interbank linkages among surviving 
banks further propagate the shock. Finally, we find results suggesting that there are real 
economic effects. These results suggest that interbank linkages act as an important channel 
of contagion and hold important policy implications. 
Keywords: contagion, systemic risk, macro-prudential analysis, deposit insurance, 
interbank market, wholesale depositors, bank runs, banking crisis, liquidity dry-ups 
JEL codes: G21, G28, E58 5
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Executive Summary 
The current global financial crisis has once again highlighted that the interbank 
markets can act like a double-edged sword. On the one hand, interbank markets play a very 
important role for the provision of liquidity among banks. On the other hand, if a bank 
fails, the interbank market could transmit the shock (interbank contagion). As a 
consequence, the fear of interbank contagion may reduce interbank lending, impairing 
liquidity provision among banks, in turn creating a credit crunch for firms and households. 
In this paper, we empirically address the role of interbank exposures as a channel of 
financial contagion.
The major problems in testing for financial contagion due to interbank linkages are 
(i) the lack of detailed data on interbank linkages during a crisis time, (ii) the dearth of 
large-bank failures, which implies a lack of events for empirical studies, and (iii) very often 
the failure of a bank is not exogenous to the general economic conditions, in turn, making it 
difficult to disentangle the contagion effects and its sources. In this paper, we overcome 
these hurdles by exploiting: (i) an event of sudden failure of a large cooperative bank in 
India – the bank failed due to fraud and was not bailed out (there was no other fraud in 
other banks and the economy was performing well); (ii) a unique dataset that allows us to 
identify interbank exposures at the time of the bank failure. This provides us with an ideal 
platform – a natural experiment – to test the hypothesis of financial contagion due to 
interbank linkages and also to study its implications.  
We find robust evidence that higher interbank exposure to the failed bank generates 
larger deposit withdrawals. We find that the probability of facing large deposit withdrawals 
increases by 34 percentage points if a bank has a high level of exposure. Moreover, we find 
that the impact of exposure on deposit withdrawals is greater for higher levels of exposure, 
thus suggesting a nonlinear effect of bank exposure on deposit withdrawals. 6
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We then explore the further implications from interbank contagion. We first explore 
whether stronger bank fundamentals play a role in reducing the magnitude of contagion. 
Specifically, we find that the impact of exposure on deposit withdrawals is higher for banks 
(i) with lower level of capital, (ii) smaller in size, and (iii) classified as weak by the 
regulator. These results suggest that weaker fundamentals of the banking system amplify 
the magnitude of interbank contagion.  
Moreover, the impact of exposure on withdrawals is larger for banks with higher 
amounts of interbank borrowing. Our analysis suggests that this finding is driven by banks 
liquidating their interbank deposits in banks with high level of exposure to the failed bank 
due to the fear of contagion. Retail depositors, moreover, also cause contagion by 
withdrawing deposits. In addition, the impact of exposure on deposit withdrawals is larger 
for banks with higher numbers of depositors, which suggests that coordination problems 
among depositors are more important in banks with higher exposure. 
Although we find interbank contagion, it is important to study its real effects over 
and above the runs. We find that banks with higher exposure levels experience reductions 
in loan growth and profitability. However, to understand the real effects, it is important to 
investigate whether other banks increase their lending to compensate for this decline. 
Interestingly, we find that banks with lower exposure competitively gain deposits, and they 
gain especially in areas where the average level of exposure of other banks is high (these 
are the areas that are likely to face higher deposit withdrawals, and thus there is maximum 
opportunity to gain deposits competitively). However, this competitive gain in deposits 
does not translate into a corresponding increase in loans or profitability, which suggests 
that these banks hoard on the excess liquidity given the difficult banking environment they 
face. Given the borrowers’ small size and bank dependence, the previous results suggest 
that there are real economic effects associated with interbank contagion.  7
ECB
Working Paper Series No 1147
January 2010
“Since the onset of the financial turmoil, increased uncertainty, reflected particularly in counterparty risk, 
has led banks to hoard liquidity. This has resulted in a significant decline of trading in the interbank money 
markets.” 
Jean-Claude Trichet, President of the European Central Bank, December 2008
Introduction 
The current global financial crisis has once again highlighted that the interbank markets can 
act like a double-edged sword. On the one hand, interbank markets play a very important 
role for the provision of liquidity among banks. On the other hand, if a bank fails, the 
interbank market could transmit the shock (interbank contagion).
1 As a consequence, the 
fear of interbank contagion may reduce interbank lending and, in turn, impair liquidity 
provision among banks. The recent drying up of liquidity in the interbank markets in the 
wake of the heightened counterparty default risk in the current financial crisis aptly reflects 
this fear. In addition, if interbank contagion materializes, a banking crisis is even more 
likely. Hence, given the economic importance of interbank markets and the large economic 
costs associated with banking crises (Friedman and Schwartz 1963; Bernanke 1983, 
Ongena et al. 2003, Calomiris and Mason 2003a, Dell’Ariccia et al. 2005, Gan 2007), it is 
of utmost importance to understand the role of the interbank market in financial contagion. 
In this paper, we empirically address the role of interbank exposures as a channel of 
financial contagion.
After the failure of a bank, the risk of financial contagion due to interbank linkages 
is primarily due to a loss in value for creditor banks that hold interbank claims in the failed 
bank (henceforth, exposure). Furthermore, the loss for creditor banks may increase over 
and above the exposure in the failed bank due to the (over)reaction of the creditor banks’ 
depositors (both retail and wholesale depositors). In consequence, the degree of contagion 
from the failed bank to another bank should depend on its level of interbank exposure to 8
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the failed bank (Allen and Gale 2000). Unfortunately, despite the importance of the 
question, there are no empirical papers that test for financial contagion due to interbank 
linkages.
A major problem in testing for financial contagion due to interbank linkages is the 
lack of detailed data on interbank linkages during a crisis time. Most often it is almost 
impossible to get information on the interbank exposures of banks. In consequence, at the 
time of the failure of a bank, it is very difficult to map the transmission of the shock due to 
interbank linkages. Apart from the lack of data on interbank exposures, another major 
problem to test for contagion is the dearth of large-bank failures, which implies a lack of 
events for empirical studies. One of the main reasons for lack of large-bank failures is that 
regulators generally resort to bailouts whenever there is a large-bank failure that poses the 
risk of contagion due to interbank linkages. For example, after studying more than 100 
bank failures, Goodhart and Schoenmaker (1995) conclude: “It has been revealed 
preference of the monetary authorities in all developed countries to rescue those large 
banks whose failure might lead to a contagious, systemic failure.” This view also comes 
forth in a speech by the Chairman of the Federal Reserve, Ben Bernanke, in October 2008 
in the context of the current financial crisis. He asserted, “The Federal Reserve will work 
closely and actively with the Treasury and other authorities to minimize systemic risk.” 
Another major hurdle for identifying the importance of interbank linkages as a channel of 
contagion is that very often the failure of the first bank is not exogenous to the general 
economic conditions, in turn, making it difficult to disentangle the contagion effects and its 
sources.
In this paper, we overcome these hurdles by exploiting: (i) an event of sudden 
failure of a large cooperative bank in India – the bank failed due to fraud and was not 
bailed out (there was no other fraud in other banks and the economy was performing well); 9
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(ii) a unique dataset that allows us to identify interbank exposures at the time of the bank 
failure. Our dataset provides us with detailed information on the interbank exposures of 
banks in the system with the failed bank. We also have information on the interbank 
linkages of banks among themselves apart from the exposures with the failed bank. This 
provides us with an ideal platform – a natural experiment – to test the hypothesis of 
financial contagion due to interbank linkages and also to study its implications. More 
specifically, we address the following questions: Does higher interbank exposure (credit 
outstanding as a fraction of total assets) to the failed bank increase deposit withdrawals? 
What factors affect the magnitude of contagion? I.e., do stronger bank fundamentals reduce 
the magnitude of contagion? Do interbank linkages among surviving banks (apart from 
exposure to the failed bank) further propagate the shock? What are the real economic 
effects of interbank contagion? 
The key finding is that higher interbank exposure to the failed bank generates larger 
deposit withdrawals. After controlling for bank fundamentals and local macroeconomic 
conditions, we find that banks with higher levels of exposure to the failed bank experience 
lower deposit growth. We also find that banks with weaker fundamentals experience lower 
deposit growth. While the effect of higher levels of exposure on deposit growth is negative, 
this does not necessarily imply that banks with higher levels of exposure suffer large 
deposit withdrawals as predicted by theories of financial contagion. To address this 
concern, we investigate whether banks with higher levels of exposure face a higher 
probability of large deposit withdrawals.
2 We find that the probability of facing large 
deposit withdrawals increases by 34 percentage points if a bank has a high level of 
exposure. Thus, exposure has an economically significant effect on deposit withdrawals. 
Finally, through piece-wise linear regressions, we find that the impact of exposure on 10
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deposit withdrawals is greater for higher levels of exposure, thus suggesting a nonlinear 
effect of bank exposure on deposit withdrawals. 
A potential concern in the interpretation of our findings is that exposure levels to 
the failed bank are voluntarily chosen by banks. To address this concern, we first check 
whether banks with higher exposure levels are ex ante different in terms of riskiness and 
profitability. We do not find any significant differences. Second, we check if exposure 
level is just a proxy for physical distance from the failed bank or for correspondent banking 
relationship with the failed bank. We find that, despite these controls, the level of exposure 
to the failed bank is significant in explaining deposit withdrawals.
3 Third, we check 
whether exposure affects deposit withdrawals before the crisis. The idea being that one 
should not expect any significant effect in the period before the failure. The results support 
this intuition, thereby suggesting that deposit withdrawals are primarily a result of exposure 
to the failed bank and are not driven by some other omitted characteristics of the banks that 
are correlated with exposure. Finally, to further push on causality, we instrument for 
exposure using a variable that indicates whether a bank lends in the interbank market 
excluding the lending to the failed bank. The economic intuition for the instrument is that 
banks that lend in general in the interbank market are also likely to have exposure to the 
failed bank and, lending in the interbank market (apart from the exposure to the failed 
bank) by itself should not be related to deposit withdrawals. We find that interbank lending 
is highly correlated with exposure (t-statistic in the first stage regression is 3.46); thus the 
instrument does not suffer from weak instrument concerns (Staiger and Stock 1997). More 
important, from the second-stage regression, the estimates suggest that the component of 
exposure to the failed bank predicted by the overall lending presence in the interbank 
market has a highly significant effect on the probability of facing large deposit 
withdrawals. 11
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The previous set of results supports the key cross-sectional hypothesis derived from 
the theory that higher exposure to the failed bank implies more deposit runs. We then 
explore the further implications from interbank contagion. We first explore whether 
stronger bank fundamentals play a role in reducing the magnitude of contagion. 
Specifically, we find that the impact of exposure on deposit withdrawals is higher for banks 
(i) with lower level of capital, (ii) smaller in size, and (iii) classified as weak by the 
regulator. These results suggest that the magnitude of contagion is lower for banks with 
stronger fundamentals. This, in turn, implies that weaker fundamentals of the banking 
system amplify the magnitude of interbank contagion.  
In addition, to understand whether interbank markets further aggravate or dampen 
the magnitude of contagion, we also investigate the effect of other outstanding interbank 
linkages among surviving banks (apart from linkages with the failed bank) on deposit 
withdrawals. We find that the amount that banks lend in the interbank market (excluding 
exposure to the failed bank) does not affect deposit withdrawals. We also do not find any 
significant effect of the amount of borrowing in the interbank market on deposit 
withdrawals, which suggests that banks do not liquidate interbank deposits from the 
average bank. However, interestingly, we find that the impact of exposure on deposit 
withdrawals is larger for banks with higher amounts of interbank borrowing. Our analysis 
suggests that this finding is driven by banks liquidating their interbank deposits in banks 
with high level of exposure to the failed bank due to the fear of contagion.
Another important question we address is which class of depositors are 
withdrawing, thereby causing the interbank contagion. That is, given the previous results, is 
it only withdrawals by other banks that are causing interbank contagion? We find that even 
if we limit the analysis to banks with no interbank borrowings (i.e., banks that do not have 
other banks as depositors), exposure to the failed bank still has a significant effect on 12
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deposit withdrawals, thus suggesting that retail depositors also cause contagion by 
withdrawing deposits. More important, we find that, even for this set of banks, interbank 
contagion is larger if bank fundamentals are weak. In addition, we find that the impact of 
exposure on deposit withdrawals is larger for banks with higher numbers of depositors, 
which suggests that coordination problems among depositors are more important in banks 
with higher exposure (Rochet and Vives 2004, Goldstein and Pauzner 2005). 
Although we find interbank contagion, it is important to study its real effects over 
and above the runs. We find that banks with higher exposure levels experience reductions 
in loan growth and profitability. However, to understand the real effects, it is important to 
investigate whether other banks increase their lending to compensate for this decline. 
Interestingly, we find that banks with lower exposure competitively gain deposits, and they 
gain especially in areas where the average level of exposure of other banks is high (these 
are the areas that are likely to face higher deposit withdrawals, and thus there is maximum 
opportunity to gain deposits competitively). However, this competitive gain in deposits 
does not translate into a corresponding increase in loans or profitability, which suggests 
that these banks hoard on the excess liquidity given the difficult banking environment they 
face. Given the borrowers’ small size and bank dependence, the previous results suggest 
that there are real economic effects associated with interbank contagion.
Our paper contributes to the literature in several dimensions. The most important 
contribution of our paper is that we show evidence that suggests that interbank exposures 
transmit the shock of a bank failure. Using a natural experiment, we test the cross-sectional 
hypothesis that higher exposure to the failed bank implies more deposit withdrawals. The 
results that we find are consistent with theories of financial contagion due to interbank 
linkages (Allen and Gale 2000, Freixas et al. 2000, Dasgupta 2004, Brusco and 
Castiglionesi 2005).
4 To the best of our knowledge, ours is the first paper that identifies 13
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whether interbank exposure to a failed bank transmits the shock. Existing studies on 
financial contagion due to interbank linkages have been limited to simulations due to lack 
of actual failure events. In addition, papers that test for contagion using an actual bank 
failure do not address the issue of interbank contagion due to lack of data on interbank 
linkages. Our paper bridges this void, in turn providing some directions for policy-making. 
Our results also contribute to the literature that examines the role of depositors in 
banking crises. The finding that the magnitude of interbank contagion is higher for banks 
with weaker fundamentals suggests that bank fundamentals play an important role in 
depositor runs. These results are more in line with the theories of runs based on 
fundamentals (Chari and Jagannathan 1988, Gorton 1988, Jacklin and Bhattacharya 1988, 
Calomiris and Gorton 1991, Calomiris and Kahn 1991, Allen and Gale 1998) as against the 
pure panic–based theories of runs (Diamond and Dybvig 1983). In addition, our paper adds 
to the literature that explores the mechanisms to mitigate the impact of a banking crisis 
(Barth et al. 2004). Our results suggest that magnitude of contagion is lower if bank 
fundamentals are strong. Thus, mechanisms to improve the strength of the banking system 
can help in dampening a crisis. Our results also contribute to the empirical literature that 
examines depositor runs on banks (Saunders and Wilson 1996, Calomiris and Mason 1997, 
Schumacher 2000, Martinez Peria and Schmukler 2001) by showing that in addition to 
bank fundamentals, interbank linkages affect deposit withdrawals. Finally, our paper also 
contributes to the literature studying the costs of bank failures (Slovin et al. 1993). Our 
findings suggest that existing studies measuring bankruptcy costs associated with large 
bank failures understate the real effects as one needs to take into account deposit 
withdrawals at other banks due to exposure to the failed bank, especially given the 
associated real economic effects. 14
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1.1 Related Literature  
Most of the existing empirical studies on contagion focus primarily on measuring equity 
returns around large failures. They test whether all banks experience negative abnormal 
returns, or whether negative returns are limited to banks with similar characteristics to 
those of the failed banks.
5 Aharony and Swary (1983) study the market reaction to the three 
biggest U.S. bank failures prior to that of Continental Illinois. Swary (1986) and Jayanti 
and Whyte (1996) examine the market effect of the failure of Continental Illinois. Aharony 
and Swary (1996) study the market reaction in the context of five large bank failures that 
occurred in the southwest region of the United States during the mid-1980s.
6 These papers 
find that surviving banks are most affected if they have portfolio characteristics similar to 
those of the failing institution. This, they argue, is evidence of information-based 
contagion. The most important feature that differentiates our paper from the literature cited 
above is that we use direct financial linkages among banks to test financial contagion due 
to interbank linkages. 
There is an alternative stream of literature that studies the possibility of financial 
contagion due to interbank linkages via simulations. In an important paper, Furfine (2003) 
uses exposure data on interbank federal funds to simulate the risk of financial contagion 
and finds it to be negligible. In contrast, Humphrey (1986) uses data from the Clearing 
House Interbank Payments System (CHIPS) to simulate the impact of a settlement failure 
of a major participant in the payment system. He shows that this failure could lead to a 
significant level of further settlement failures. Upper and Worms (2004) study financial 
contagion due to interbank exposures in the German interbank market. Through a 
counterfactual simulation, they find that the failure of a single bank could lead to the 
breakdown of 15% of the banking system. Elsinger et al. (2003) use detailed data from the 
Austrian interbank market and study the possibility of contagious failures due to an 15
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idiosyncratic shock. In their simulations, they find the probability to be low. They also find 
that although the probability of contagious default is low, there are cases in which up to 
75% of the defaults are due to contagion. Although the above papers explore the issue of 
financial contagion due to interbank exposures, they do not capture the endogenous 
responses of depositors and creditors during a crisis (Upper 2006). Our paper differs from 
the papers cited above by using an actual failure in order to test financial contagion in the 
banking system, in turn allowing us to study the endogenous response of depositors and 
creditors in the propagation of the crisis.
7
Another related strand of empirical literature investigates depositor runs on banks 
during a crisis. This literature explores whether depositors run randomly across banks or 
run on banks based on fundamentals (i.e., a test between the sunspot-based theory of bank 
runs by Diamond and Dybvig [1983] versus the fundamental and information-based theory 
of bank runs by Chari and Jagannathan [1988], Jacklin and Bhattacharya [1988], and Allen 
and Gale [1998]).
8 Schumacher (2000) studies depositor behavior in Argentina following 
the Tequila Shock and finds that depositors concentrate their runs primarily on 
fundamentally weak banks. Martinez Peria and Schmukler (2001) also find evidence of 
depositor discipline in Argentina, Mexico, and Chile. Calomiris and Mason (1997) look at 
the Chicago Banking Panic of 1932 and investigate whether solvent banks failed during the 
crisis. They find that banks that failed during the panic were ex ante weak banks.
9 Gorton 
(1988) studies the banking panics during the U.S. National Banking Era (1865–1914). He 
finds them not random events but products of revisions in the perceived risk of the banking 
system based on the arrival of new information. Our paper adds to this literature by 
including financial linkages of banks with other banks in the bank fundamental 
characteristic variables and then studying depositor runs. 16
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The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the institutional 
details of the Indian banking system. Section 3 provides a description of the event. Section 
4 summarizes the data used in the analysis. Section 5 discusses the empirical strategy of the 
paper along with a discussion of the results. Section 6 provides conclusions and suggests 
some policy measures. 
2. Institutional details 
Before we proceed to describe the event that we use to study contagion, a brief 
summary of the institutional setting is helpful to set things in perspective. The Indian 
banking system primarily consists of three types of banks: public, private, and cooperative 
banks. There are three different cooperative banks in each state: the state cooperative bank 
(each state has a cooperative bank), followed by the local district central cooperative bank, 
and then the urban cooperative banks. The main difference is that the state cooperative 
bank and the district central cooperative bank are controlled by the local governing body of 
the state. Note that our sample is limited to urban cooperative banks and does not include 
state and district co-op banks. Cooperative banks’ deposit base is primarily made up of 
small depositors. One point to take note of is that depositors of cooperative banks are not 
required to hold an equity claim in the bank. Also, shareholders of cooperative banks have 
limited liability. Thus, the cooperative structure of the banks does not lead to significant 
differences in characteristics of depositors as compared with banks that have other 
ownership structures. With regard to the loan portfolio, it is mandatory for cooperative 
banks to lend at least 60% of their loan portfolio to the “priority” sector (see Banerjee and 
Duflo 2002). 17
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The main regulatory authority of the banking system in India is the Reserve Bank of 
India (RBI). Cooperative banks, however, come under dual regulation — i.e., they are 
supervised by the RBI as well as by the local state government. The RBI is responsible for 
monitoring the banks’ portfolios, while the state government is responsible for governance 
issues. The insurance cover granted under the deposit insurance scheme is Rs. 100,000 
(approximately U.S.$2,000) for each account. The deposit insurance is based on a flat 
premium. Though deposit insurance is present, there are several delays in processing the 
claims of depositors, as the central bank first suspends convertibility when a bank 
approaches failure. After suspension of convertibility, the central bank decides whether to 
liquidate a bank or arrange a merger with another bank. During this period, depositors are 
allowed a one-time nominal withdrawal up to a maximum amount that is stipulated by the 
central bank. In most cases, depositors are allowed a one-time withdrawal of up to Rs. 
1,000 (U.S.$20) per account. The stipulated cash reserve ratio and statutory liquidity ratio 
to be maintained by the banks are 5.5% and 25%, respectively.
10
The interbank market for funds in India is composed of two parts. One is the call 
money market, which is similar to the federal overnight market for funds. The call money 
market is mainly dominated by private banks and public sector banks, though some large 
cooperative banks do have a presence. The other interbank market is the market for direct 
placement of deposits and borrowings by banks among one another. The cooperative banks 
are generally very active in this market and use this market to park their surplus funds 
(mostly with other cooperative banks). The contracts entered in this market take the form of 
demandable debt, unlike those in the call money market, which are standard debt contracts 
(contracts in the call money market are entered for a stipulated period of time and cannot 
be liquidated before maturity). While the funds transacted in the call money market are not 18
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insured, the funds placed by banks as deposits in other banks are insured only up to the 
ordinary deposit insurance levels (Demirguç-Kunt et al. 2005). 
3. Event description 
We now turn to the description of the event that we use to study contagion (see Figure 1 for 
the event time line). The whole episode started with a fraud in the largest cooperative bank, 
named Madhavpura Mercantile Co-operative Bank (hereafter referred to as MMCB), in the 
state of Gujarat. MMCB had granted loans to a stockbroker without appropriate collateral, 
in contravention of the guidelines prescribed by the central bank. Cooperative banks were 
not allowed to have direct exposure to stock market or lend to stockbrokers. The amount of 
loans given to the stockbroker amounted to nearly 80% of the deposit base (Rs. 10 billion 
were advanced as industrial loans to stockbrokers without appropriate collateral). On 
March 8, 2001, some major brokers defaulted on their pay-in obligations to the stock 
exchange. Rumors were floating around that MMCB had overstretched lending positions to 
a major stockbroker who had suffered huge losses in his share dealings in a select group of 
stocks. This led to a run on the bank on March 9 and 12, 2001. Because the bank failed to 
repay depositors on March 13, 2001, the central bank suspended convertibility and 
restrained the bank from making payment to depositors beyond Rs. 1,000 per account.
Apart from the fact that MMCB was the biggest cooperative bank in the state, 
another crucial aspect of the MMCB failure was that it had a significant number of banks 
connected to it via interbank transactions. Out of the total deposit base of Rs. 12 billion, 
deposits from other banks constituted about Rs. 6 billion. The primary reason for its large 
number of connections was that MMCB had the status of a scheduled bank, which allowed 
it to carry out multi-state operations.
11 Smaller cooperative banks in the state maintained 19
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deposits with MMCB because MMCB provided remittance facilities within and across the 
state.
12
Many cooperative banks also used the deposits placed with MMCB to fulfill the 
statutory liquidity requirements. This setup is similar to the reserve pyramiding that 
prevailed in the United States prior to the passing of the Federal Reserve Act, which led to 
the establishment of Federal Reserve Banks (Broaddus 1993). Thus, interbank deposits 
placed in MMCB were to a large extent exogenous in the sense that these deposits were 
placed for transactional convenience rather than for direct lending to MMCB. Apart from 
the linkages that banks had to MMCB due to direct placement of deposits, some banks 
were also linked to MMCB due to their call money lending and pay orders. 
An important point to note is that at the time of failure, the economy of the state 
was performing well: Gujarat’s GDP growth was 9.8% in 2001 as compared with 0.6% in 
2000 and –1.6% in 1999.
13 The public sector banks witnessed an increase in deposits and 
also increased the amount of lending in the period after the shock. Furthermore, there were 
no other frauds in the banking system, and none of the other banks had any lending to the 
defaulted broker (none of the other banks had any positions to the defaulted brokers that 
were revealed in the audits ex post by the central bank). Also, ex post in the report released 
after the investigation of the fraud, it was found that none of the other cooperative banks 
were involved in the fraud. Thus, the shock was idiosyncratic as it affected only the failed 
bank.
14
After the collapse of MMCB, there was a huge debate about whether MMCB 
should be bailed out. A committee was convened to study the possibility of its revival. The 
fundamental aspect of the revival plan addressed by the committee was to choose one of 
the three following options: closure, merger or takeover, or comprehensive financial and 
operational restructuring. Based on the recommendations of the committee, it was finally 20
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decided in August 2001 that MMCB would be revived. The revival scheme was organized 
in terms of a privately arranged bailout. The revival package required the participation of 
all the cooperative banks in the state, contributing 4% of their deposit base to the revival 
fund. This money was to be insured by a guarantee provided by the government. The 
revival package, however, did not insure the deposits that banks already held with MMCB. 
The deposits and call money exposures that banks had with MMCB prior to its failure were 
to be retained and converted into term deposits for a period of four years at 7.5% per 
annum. 
Although there was a guarantee provided by the government, the revival scheme 
never took off. Most of the cooperative banks in the state were reluctant to contribute 
funds. The committee in charge of implementing the revival scheme also noted that the 
recovery of the amount lent to the stock brokers was very unlikely. 
 After the failure of MMCB, the immediate concern of the central bank was to limit 
the contagion. The central bank was mainly concerned with the propagation of the crisis 
due to interbank connections. This fact was highlighted in the statement made by the 
governor of the central bank in his monetary policy address for 2001–2002. He stated, 
“Recent experience has shown that irresponsible and unethical behavior on the part of even 
a few cooperative banks in the country can have some contagion effect beyond the 
particular area or the state concerned.” The immediate policy response by the central bank 
was to limit the amount of exposure banks could have in the call money market. As on 
April 2001, cooperative banks were not allowed to borrow more than 2% of their deposit 
base as of the end of March in the previous year. There was, however, no restriction on 
lending in the call money market, and the central bank was ready to provide liquidity to 
banks against appropriate collateral if the need arose. The central bank also noted that 
parking of funds by cooperative banks with other cooperative banks posed a systemic risk. 21
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In response, it issued a directive in May 2001 asking all the cooperative banks not to renew 
or place fresh deposits with other cooperative banks. It was, however, left to the discretion 
of the banks to decide if they wanted to unwind their deposits prematurely, although it was 
stipulated that by the end of June 2002, they should unwind their deposits with other 
cooperative banks. Another regulatory response of the central bank, immediately after the 
failure, on March 16, 2001, was to issue a public statement that all banks had adhered to 
the prescribed norms related to stock market lending. 
4. Data
Because there is no single source that has all the balance sheet information (either in paper 
or in electronic format), we had to hand collect annual reports of banks. Given the 
difficulty of the task, we streamlined the data collection. We first limit our analysis to 
cooperative banks located in the state of Gujarat as there were only very few banks outside 
the state of Gujarat that had connections to the failed bank.
15 We further limit our sample to 
banks that have a deposit base of more than Rs. 250 million (5 million dollars) as of March 
31, 2001. Note that this understates the effect of runs, as some banks that faced 
withdrawals between the failure of MMCB and March 31, 2001, whose deposit base fell 
below Rs. 250 million are not included in the sample. We find that using this cutoff led to a 
total of 142 banks, constituting 87% of the total deposit base of the cooperative banks in 
Gujarat and 13% of the total banking system in the state. Moreover, these banks cover a 
major portion of the linkages with the failed bank.
16 For the 142 banks in the sample, we 
obtain data on their deposit figures as on March 31, 2000; December 31, 2000; March 31, 
2001; and December 31, 2001, along with the relevant balance sheet variables as on March 
31, 2000, and March 31, 2001. Note that the deposit data as of December 31, 2000, and of 22
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December 31, 2001, is obtained from the central bank because cooperative banks publicly 
report their deposit data only as of March 31 of every year. 
We also have data on the outstanding credit and debit position each bank has with 
MMCB as on March 13, 2001 (date of failure). In addition, we have data on the aggregate 
outstanding level of claims that each bank has with and from other banks in the interbank 
market as of March 31, 2001. All these data are obtained from the central bank. Thus, for 
each ongoing bank, we know: (i) its exposure to the failed bank (MMCB); (ii) the amount 
of credit outstanding it has with other ongoing banks in the system; (iii) the amount of 
funds it has from other ongoing banks in the system. An important point to note is that all 
these interbank claims are unsecured. We also compile deposit rates offered by banks from 
the annual reports (i.e., on March 31, 2001, and on March 31, 2002), if they were available. 
Finally, we collected information on media articles about bank runs that were published 
during the crisis. We first collected information on the articles that appeared in the national 
newspapers and then looked for additional information in the regional newspapers. In 
addition, we also looked in the annual reports of banks to check for voluntary release of 
information pertaining to the credit and debit outstanding with the failed bank (MMCB). 
5. Empirical results 
We now return to the central question of whether there is financial contagion due to 
interbank linkages. To study financial contagion due to interbank linkages with the failed 
bank, we first construct a variable called exposure that represents the credit outstanding of 
a bank with the failed bank (MMCB) as fraction of its total assets. One point to take note of 
is that the failed bank (MMCB) did not lend to any bank in our sample. Notice also that the 
variable exposure is measured on March 13, 2001 (as on the date of the failure). We then 23
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construct a variable called deposit growth that for each bank captures the change in the 
level of deposits between March 31, 2001, and December 31, 2001.
17 We also define a 
dummy variable that reflects large deposit withdrawals (tail risk). Since we only have 142 
observations in our sample, we select the tail risk as the 20% of the observations in our 
sample with the highest deposit withdrawals. This corresponds to a cutoff of deposit 
withdrawals greater than 12.75% (i.e., deposit growth lower than –12.75%). Thus, large 
deposit withdrawals is a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if deposit growth is 
lower than or equal to –12.75%, and 0 otherwise. Note that even if we use other thresholds 
like 15% we do not find any change in the results of the paper.
To control for other factors that could influence deposit withdrawals, we construct 
several measures using March 31, 2001, balance sheet information. We measure bank 
profitability by return on assets ratio (see the Appendix for exact definitions of all the 
variables). We also use the capital-to-asset ratio as measure of financial health of the bank. 
We also control for the size of banks. The measures that we use to proxy for riskiness of 
banks, or susceptibility to a crisis, are: the ratings by the regulator (which classifies banks 
as weak or not) and credit-to-deposit ratio. Ideally, we would like to use the level of non-
performing assets as a measure of riskiness, but cooperative banks are not required to 
disclose the details of non-performing assets. The ratings by the regulator provide a 
substitute for the level of non-performing assets.
18 The credit-to-deposit ratio captures the 
illiquidity risk of a bank. We also define a dummy variable called media release that takes 
a value of 1 for a bank if a report appeared in the newspapers about runs in the bank, and 
zero otherwise. Note that most of the media articles just stated a bank was facing a huge 
depositor withdrawal. Also, all the articles except one appeared immediately after the 
failure—i.e., between March 13, 2001, and March 31, 2001. In addition, to control for local 
macroeconomic factors that could affect deposits, we use dummies for districts where 24
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banks are headquartered as the bulk of a cooperative bank’s business and deposit base is in 
the district where it is headquartered (Mian 2006). 
Table 1 provides summary statistics of the data. We find that on average, banks 
experience a negative deposit growth (4.96% loss in deposits) in the period between March 
31, 2001, and December 31, 2001. We also see that there is wide degree of variation in the 
deposit growth across banks (the standard deviation is 13.3%), with some banks 
experiencing a 50% loss in deposits, while other banks experience a positive deposit inflow 
to the tune of 50%. The average deposit growth in the period between March 31, 2000, and 
March 31, 2001, is 14.1%. The average exposure that banks have to the failed bank is 
3.27% of their total assets. The average of other interbank lending (lending in the interbank 
market apart from the exposure to the failed bank) is 2.9%. The average capital-to-asset 
and return-on-assets ratios are 11% and 1%, respectively. The average credit-to-deposit 
ratio is 64% (refer to Table 1 for summary statistics of the remaining variables). 
A detailed look at the exposure levels of banks shows that out of a total sample of 
142 banks, 121 banks are connected to the failed bank, with the highest exposure level 
being 23% of total assets. The average exposure that banks have to the failed bank is 3.27% 
of their total assets, while the median is 0.5%. Out of the total of 121 banks that are 
connected to the failed bank, 20 banks have more than 9.21% (average plus one standard 
deviation of banks with positive exposure) of their assets invested in the failed bank. We 
define these banks as having high exposure. Twenty-one banks have exposure levels 
between 3.83% (average of banks with positive exposure) and 9.21%. We define these 
banks as having medium exposure. Finally, 80 banks have positive exposure levels but 
lower than 3.83%. We define these banks as having low exposure. 
Decomposing the deposit growth and the probability of large deposit withdrawals 
for different categories of exposure, we can see that the deposit growth that banks 25
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experience is decreasing in the exposure levels to the failed bank (figure 2a). We also see 
that the probability of large deposit withdrawals is increasing in the exposure levels. For 
instance, banks that are in the high-exposure region face a 35% probability of facing large 
deposit withdrawals, while the corresponding probability is only 4.76% for banks in the 
zero-exposure region. Figure 2b presents the relationship between exposure and deposit 
growth for the period before the failure of the large bank. The results are in sharp contrast 
to those reported in Figure 2a. In the period before the failure of the large bank, we see that 
there is no relation between exposure levels and deposit flow (the probability of large 
deposit withdrawals is also zero for all levels of exposure). Moreover, we find that banks 
with a high level of exposure to the failed bank do not differ in ex ante characteristics as 
compared with banks with low levels of exposure. As the results in Table 2 show, there are 
no significant differences in terms of profit, risk (proxied by deposit rate), and size across 
these two categories of banks (not reported; even if we compare ex ante characteristics of 
banks as on March 31, 2000, we find similar results). 
5.1 The effect of exposure on deposit withdrawals 
From Figures 2a and 2b, there appears to be a correlation between exposure and deposit 
withdrawals only after the failure of the large bank. To further examine whether the level 
of exposure to the failed bank has an effect on deposit withdrawals, we first examine the 
effect of exposure on deposit growth using a cross-sectional regression approach. In Table 
3, column 1, controlling for other fundamental characteristics of banks and local 
macroeconomic conditions, we see that exposure to the failed bank is a significant 
predictor (at 1%) of deposit growth. We find that banks with higher levels of exposure to 
the failed bank experience lower growth in deposits. We also find that banks with higher 
returns on assets have significantly higher deposit growth. Banks that are classified as weak 
by the regulator experience lower deposit growth. Furthermore, banks with higher fraction 26
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of illiquid assets -- proxied by credit-to-deposit ratio -- have a lower deposit growth. We 
also find that the media release dummy is highly significant in explaining deposit growth—
i.e., banks that have a media report about them have lower growth in deposits after the 
media release. 
As it is possible that exposure could just be proxying for other characteristics of 
banks, like distance from the failed bank or a correspondent banking relationship with the 
failed bank, in column 2 we introduce controls both for correspondent banking relationship 
with the failed bank and for distance from the failed bank. In column 2, we also control for 
deposit growth in the previous year (between March 31, 2000, and March 31, 2001) to 
capture past performance of banks. As the results in column 2 show, we find that lagged 
deposit growth has a positive and significant effect on current deposit growth. We do not, 
however, find any significant effect of correspondent banking relationship or distance from 
the failed bank on deposit growth. More important, we find that despite these controls, 
exposure to the failed bank continues to have a significant negative effect on deposit 
growth. In column 3, we look at the effect of deposits held in other banks (apart from the 
failed bank) on deposit growth. Interestingly, we find that only the level of exposure to the 
failed bank has a significant negative effect on deposit growth. There is no significant 
effect of higher lending to other banks on deposit growth. 
In column 4, we introduce a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 for banks 
with no exposure to the failed bank, and zero otherwise. The dummy variable is statistically 
and economically significant: banks with positive exposure to the failed bank on average 
experience a negative deposit growth of 6.2%, as compared with banks with no exposure. 
We also find that banks with high levels of exposure to the failed bank experience, on 
average, an additional lower deposit growth of 8.6%, as compared with banks with low 27
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exposure (column 5). The preliminary results in Table 5 suggest that depositor withdrawals 
are based both on the exposure to the failed bank and on bank fundamentals. 
Although in Table 3 we find that higher level of exposure to the failed bank has a 
negative effect on deposit growth, theoretical models of interbank contagion (Allen and 
Gale 2000, Dasgupta 2004, Brusco and Castiglionesi 2005) predict that higher exposure to 
the failed bank leads to a higher probability of large deposit withdrawals. Hence, to check 
whether exposure to the failed bank affects the probability of large deposit withdrawals, we 
run probits where the dependent variable is a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if 
deposit growth is lower than or equal to –12.75% (large deposit withdrawals). With this 
cutoff, 20% of the banks in our sample suffer large deposit withdrawals (none of the results 
of the paper are altered if we use other cutoffs, like –15%). 
As we can see in Table 4, column 1 to column 3, higher exposure to the failed bank 
increases the probability of facing large deposit withdrawals. The variable exposure is 
statistically significant at 1%. In columns 4 and 5, we find that the dummy for banks with 
high exposure is statistically significant at 1%. Moreover, if we derive the marginal effects 
for the probit in column 5, we find that (at the average level) a bank with a high level of 
exposure (vis-à-vis a bank with a low level of exposure) experiences an increase in 
outcome probability of large deposit withdrawals of 0.34. Hence, not only is exposure 
statistically significant, but it is also economically significant. Notice that in column 1, 
when we put district controls, we lose many observations because many district controls 
perfectly predict the outcome (we have 16 district controls and only 142 banks). 
Nevertheless, exposure is still significant at 1%. Also notice that most of the bank 
fundamental variables have similar effects (in terms of signs) as those reported in Table 3. 
All in all, the results in Tables 3 and 4 suggest that exposure impacts deposit withdrawals. 28
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Apart from exposure to the failed bank leading to large deposit withdrawals, theoretical 
literature (Allen and Gale 2000, Dasgupta 2004, Brusco and Castiglionesi 2005) also points 
toward nonlinearities in the effect of exposure on large deposit withdrawals and, possibly, 
on deposit growth. To investigate this hypothesis, we run a piecewise linear regression (see 
Morck et al. 1988). As we can see from Table 5, column 1, we cannot reject that the 
coefficient for banks in the low exposure region is different from zero. In addition, in 
column 2, the dummy for banks with zero exposure has a positive and significant 
coefficient, in turn implying that banks with zero exposure have higher deposit growth. 
More important, we reject the hypothesis that the coefficient of the high-exposure region is 
equal to the coefficient of the low-exposure region, thus suggesting that the effect of 
exposure on deposit growth is nonlinear. 
In columns 3 and 4, we investigate nonlinear effects of exposure on the probability of
large deposit withdrawals. As the results show, we find only that banks in the high-exposure
region face a higher probability of large deposit withdrawals. In addition, we reject that the
coefficients are equal. Interestingly, we find that banks with zero exposure experience
lower probability of large deposit withdrawals. All in all, these results suggest that there
is a nonlinear effect of exposure on deposit withdrawals. In particular, the sensitivity 
of exposure on deposit withdrawals is greater for banks with high levels of exposure.
5.1.2 The immediate effect of exposure on deposit withdrawals 
To analyze the immediate impact of exposure on deposit growth (between March 13 and 
31, 2001), we use data on deposit growth for the period between December 31, 2000, and 
March 31, 2001. In addition, we also use balance sheet data as on March 31, 2000. In Table 
6, column 1, we find that exposure has a significant negative effect on deposit growth. In 
column 2, we also find that the dummy for banks with high levels of exposure is significant 
5.1.1 The nonlinear effect of exposure 29
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and has a negative effect on deposit growth. When we run the piece-wise linear regression, 
we again find a nonlinear effect: only banks with high levels of exposure experience lower 
deposit growth (column 3). The results in Table 6 suggest a negative correlation between 
exposure to the failed bank and deposit growth even in the period immediately after the 
failure. To make sure that the correlation between exposure to the failed bank and deposit 
growth is a result of the failure and not driven by omitted characteristics, we look at the 
effect of exposure to the failed bank on deposit growth in the period between December 31, 
2000, and March 31, 2000—i.e., the period before the crisis. As the results in column 4 
show, we find that there is no effect of exposure to the failed bank on deposit growth in the 
period before the failure. This suggests that the effect of exposure on deposit growth is 
primarily due to the failure of the large bank. 
5.1.3 The effect of exposure on deposit rate change 
While the results so far suggest that exposure to the failed bank has a significant effect on 
deposit withdrawals, it could be possible that banks with higher exposure reduced their rate 
offered on deposits (due to regulatory pressure), thereby facing higher deposit withdrawals. 
In order to investigate this possibility, we analyze whether changes in the deposit rate paid 
by banks are related to the level of exposure. As the results in Table 7, column 1, show, we 
do not find any significant relationship between change in the deposit rate and exposure 
levels. Moreover, the correlation coefficient between the high-exposure dummy and the 
deposit rate change is –0.03. These results suggest that the effect of exposure on deposit 
withdrawals is not due to change in deposit rates. 
5.1.4 Communication of exposure in the banks’ annual reports 
The finding that banks with higher levels of exposure to the failed bank experience higher 
deposit withdrawals raises the question of whether depositors have access to the 30
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information on the outstanding credit position of banks with the failed bank. One possible 
way depositors might get this information is through voluntary disclosure by banks of their 
interbank positions in their annual reports. To investigate the possibility of banks 
voluntarily releasing information in the period in which we measure deposit withdrawals, 
we check whether information on exposure is provided by banks in their 2001 annual 
report -- released between July and December 2001. We find that some banks voluntarily 
release information. 
In order to further investigate the characteristics of banks that release information 
on exposures to the failed bank, we run a probit, the results of which are reported in Table 
7, column 2. We find that banks with lower levels of exposure to the failed bank are more 
likely to release information.
19 We also find that banks that have a media release are less 
likely to release information. Interestingly, we find that banks that have a correspondent 
banking relationship with the failed bank are more likely to release information. These 
results are partially consistent with the predictions of games of voluntary disclosure with 
verifiable information, where good types have an incentive to disclose their type (Okuno-
Fujiwara et al. 1990, Vives 2004). However, we do not find complete unraveling of 
information. 
When we reestimate the deposit growth regression (not reported) and the 
probability of large deposit withdrawals excluding the banks that released information, we 
find that exposure to the failed bank is still a highly significant predictor of withdrawals in 
this subsample (column 3). In other words, even for banks that reported no information on 
exposure to the failed bank, the exposure level is a significant predictor of deposit 
withdrawals. This, coupled with the findings in Table 6 that banks with high level of 
exposure experience lower deposit growth immediately after the failure, suggests that 
depositors might be acting on private information obtained through monitoring (Calomiris 31
ECB
Working Paper Series No 1147
January 2010
and Kahn 1991) and/or on alternative channels like rumors or word of mouth 
communication (Kelly and O’Grada 2000, Iyer and Puri 2007). 
5.1.5 Instrumental variable regressions 
One of the problems of the regressions reported in Table 3 is that banks that are badly 
performing (experiencing a lower deposit growth) may choose higher levels of exposure. 
Therefore, to address this self-selection problem and get a better understanding of the 
causal link between exposure and deposit growth, we use the instrumental variable 
approach. For identification, a natural candidate to instrument for exposure is a variable 
that proxies whether banks lend in the interbank market (excluding lending to the failed 
bank): banks that lend in the interbank market are also likely to lend to the failed bank and 
vice versa. We, therefore, create a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 for banks that 
have deposits outstanding (lend) in the interbank market (excluding exposure to the failed 
bank), zero otherwise. In particular, the dummy for banks that lend in the interbank market 
does not have any direct effect on deposit withdrawals. 
In Table 7, columns 4 and 5, we run an instrumental variable probit for the effect of 
exposure on large deposit withdrawals (for the period between March 31, 2001, and 
December 31, 2001). To instrument for exposure, we use the dummy that takes a value of 1 
for banks that also lend to the other banks in the interbank market (excluding the lending to 
the failed bank). As we can see in the first stage regression (column 4), the dummy for 
banks that have an overall lending presence in the interbank market is a highly significant 
determinant of exposure. In particular, the t-statistic of the hypothesis that the overall 
lending presence–based instrument can be excluded from the regression--i.e. that the 
coefficient on it is 0, equaling 3.46. Hence, the F-statistic of the exclusion hypothesis 
(F=11.97) exceeds the rule-of-thumb threshold of 10 recommended by Staiger and Stock 
(1997) to avoid weak instrument concerns. More important, the second stage regression 32
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estimates (column 5) suggest that the component of exposure to the failed bank predicted 
by the overall lending presence in the interbank market has a highly significant effect on 
the probability of facing large deposit withdrawals.
20
5.2 Implications of interbank contagion  
The results so far show that exposure to the failed bank has a significant effect on deposit 
withdrawals. Now we study the further implications of interbank contagion. 
5.2.1 Interbank linkages among ongoing banks 
We proceed to investigate whether banks with a higher fraction of their deposits held by 
other banks (i.e., banks with higher borrowing from the interbank market) face higher 
deposit withdrawals.
21 There are several possible reasons why banks with higher fractions 
of deposits/borrowings from other banks may face higher deposit withdrawals: (i) banks 
may liquidate their interbank deposits in order to obtain liquidity in a crisis time; (ii) banks 
with higher interbank lending may fear contagion due to interbank linkages, thus 
liquidating their deposits in other banks -- especially in banks with higher levels of 
exposure to the failed bank; (iii) banks might unwind their deposits in other banks due to 
the mandate of the central bank to not renew deposits in other banks. 
In Table 8, column 1, we do not find that banks with a higher fraction of their 
deposits held by other banks experience lower deposit growth. The finding that the fraction 
of borrowings from other banks does not directly affect deposit growth suggests that the 
mandate of the central bank was not binding. It also suggests that banks did not randomly 
liquidate their deposits in the interbank market. However, interestingly, we find in columns 
2 and 3 that the interaction of exposure and fraction of borrowings from other banks is both 
economically and statistically significant. This implies that the effect of exposure to the 
failed bank on deposit withdrawals is higher for banks that borrow more from the interbank 
market. 33
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It could be possible that banks with higher exposure to the failed bank borrow more 
from the interbank market in order to obtain liquidity. If this were true, the interaction of 
exposure and fraction of deposits from other banks should be significant but not because of 
fear of banking contagion. To address this concern, we regress fraction of deposits from 
other banks on bank fundamentals -- including exposure. From the results in column 4, we 
do not find any significant relationship between bank fundamentals and the fraction of 
deposits from other banks. More important, we do not find any relationship between 
exposure levels to the failed bank and the fraction of deposits from other banks. In sum, the 
finding that the interaction variable between exposure and interbank borrowings affects 
deposit withdrawals suggests that banks might liquidate their deposits in other banks with 
high levels of exposure to the failed bank due to the fear of further contagion. Also, the 
results from Table 8 show that for banks with lower exposure to the failed bank, the 
fraction of deposits from other banks do not affect deposit withdrawals, thus suggesting 
that there is no random panic in the interbank market. 
Given the findings in Table 8, columns 1 through 4, a natural question that arises is 
whether the effect of exposure on deposit withdrawals that we find in Table 3 and 4 is 
primarily driven by the liquidation of deposits by banks. To address this concern, we run 
the regressions for banks that do not have deposits from other banks. We find that even for 
banks that have no deposits from other banks, exposure has a significant effect on deposit 
withdrawals (column 5 and 6), suggesting that retail depositors also withdrew during the 
crisis. 
5.2.2 The effect of exposure when bank fundamentals are stronger 
The results so far suggest that higher exposure to the failed bank significantly increases 
deposit withdrawals (i.e., contagion due to interbank linkages). In addition, the results also 
suggest that depositor withdrawals are higher in banks with lower fundamentals. However, 34
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from a policy point of view, it is important to understand how the magnitude of contagion 
experienced is related to fundamentals--i.e., which factors help mitigate the extent of 
contagion. Theory (Allen and Gale 2000, Dasgupta 2004 Brusco and Castiglionesi 2005) 
also suggests that contagion due to interbank linkages should be higher when bank 
fundamentals are weaker -- i.e., the effect of higher exposure on deposit withdrawals 
should be lower for banks with stronger fundamentals since they can better withstand the 
crisis. To investigate this hypothesis, we interact exposure with variables that proxy for 
bank fundamentals.
22 Table 9 presents the results. 
From column 1 and 5, we find that the effect of exposure on large deposit 
withdrawals is lower for banks with higher capital-to-asset ratios.
23 From column 2 and 5, 
we find that the effect of exposure on large deposit withdrawals is increasing in the number 
of depositors in the bank. We also find that the impact of exposure on deposit growth is 
stronger for banks with higher numbers of depositors (column 6).
24 This result suggests that 
contagion is higher when there is higher likelihood of coordination problems among 
depositors (proxied by the number of depositors). This finding is consistent with the 
theories of bank runs using global games where coordination problems that end up in bank 
runs are a consequence of weak bank fundamentals (Rochet and Vives 2004, Goldstein and 
Pauzner 2005). From columns 3 and 6, we also find that the impact of exposure on deposit 
growth is stronger for banks classified as weak ex ante by the regulator. Also, we find that 
the effect of exposure on large deposit withdrawals is higher for banks classified as weak. 
From column 6, we find that the impact of exposure on deposit growth is stronger for 
smaller banks.
25 Finally, in columns 5 and 6 we present the results of all the interactions, 
including the interaction of exposure and interbank borrowings. 
The finding that the impact of exposure on contagion depends on bank 
fundamentals could be due to the important role other banks play as depositors. Hence, to 35
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analyze the role of retail depositors, in column 7 we analyze the same regression as in 
column 6, restricting the sample to banks that do not have other banks as depositors. The 
results in column 7 suggest that (retail) depositors also run more on banks that have higher 
exposure and weaker fundamentals.
26
All in all, these results suggest that contagion due to interbank linkages is stronger 
when bank fundamentals are weaker. These results are consistent with theories of bank 
runs based on fundamentals (Chari and Jagannathan 1988, Gorton 1988, Jacklin and 
Bhattacharya 1988, Calomiris and Gorton 1991, Calomiris and Kahn 1991, Allen and Gale 
1998). In addition, these results suggest that the effect of an idiosyncratic shock on the rest 
of the banking system is higher when both exposure of the banking system to the failed 
bank is higher and fundamentals of the banking system are weaker. As discussed later, this 
has important policy implications.  
5.3 Real consequences of financial contagion 
While interbank exposures act as a channel of financial contagion, it is important to 
understand if there are real economic effects. We find that higher bank exposure to the 
failed bank implies more liquidity problems, both stemming from retail depositors and 
from bank depositors. These problems could have a direct negative impact on bank profits. 
In addition, banks can react to the funding problems either by decreasing liquid assets 
and/or by decreasing loans that can further reduce bank profits. We, therefore, examine 
whether banks with higher exposure experience a reduction in loan, credit-to-deposit ratio, 
and profitability.
From Table 10, columns 1 and 2, we find that banks with higher exposure 
experience lower loan growth (negative loan growth).
27 In addition, we do not find any 
significant change in the credit-to-deposit ratio for banks with higher level of exposure 
(column 3), thus suggesting that banks offset reduction in deposits with a correspondingly 36
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similar reduction in loans rather than a reduction in liquid assets. Interestingly, we find that 
banks that are more profitable reduce their credit-to-deposit ratio. There are two possible 
reasons. One possibility is that banks rebalance their portfolios toward more liquid assets in 
light of the crisis. Alternatively, it is also possible that more profitable banks gain deposits 
in the crisis and then hoard on this liquidity rather than increasing their lending. Finally, not 
surprisingly given the previous results, we also find that banks with higher exposure have a 
lower growth in profitability (see columns 4 and 5).
Although the results above suggest that banks with higher level of exposure cut 
back on loans and also experience a decline in profits, to analyze the real economic effects 
in the aggregate, one needs to examine whether other banks increase their loans to bridge 
the deficit. Thus, to further investigate the real economic effects of the financial contagion, 
we first examine whether some banks gain competitively from the failure of others. We 
examine whether banks with low exposure to the failed bank gain more deposits and, 
especially, in areas where the average level of exposure of other banks is high (these are the 
areas that are likely to face higher deposit withdrawals and thus there is maximum 
opportunity to gain deposits competitively). In Table 11, column 1, we first report that 
banks with lower exposure gain deposits. Moreover, in column 2 we interact the average 
exposure of other banks in the same district with a low-exposure dummy. Interestingly, we 
find that banks with lower exposure gain more deposits when the average exposure level of 
other banks in the district is high. This suggests that banks with lower exposure 
competitively gain deposits in districts in which the exposure, and hence the deposit loss, 
of other banks is high. In addition to banks competitively gaining deposits, we also find 
that banks suffer higher deposit withdrawals in areas where the average level of exposure 
of other banks is high, thus suggesting that there is some spillover of pure contagion. In 
column 3, we control for the number of other banks in the same district and find similar 
results.37
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Although banks with low exposure competitively gain deposits, in column 4 we 
investigate whether they also increase their lending. We do not find any significant increase 
in lending immediately. To further investigate whether lending increased in the medium 
term in column 5, we examine the loan growth for period between December 2001 and 
March 2002. We again do not find any significant increase in loans. These results suggest 
that there are lasting real effects stemming from financial contagion due to interbank 
linkages. One possible reason for the previous findings is that banks might hoard excess 
liquidity during a crisis, especially when the increase in deposits comes as a result of 
withdrawals from other banks in the neighborhood with high exposure. Finally, in column 
6, we do not find any significant increase in profitability for banks that gain deposits 
competitively.  
In sum, given that bulk of the borrowers of these banks are of small size and might 
find it difficult to obtain credit from other sources (Khwaja and Mian 2007, Jiménez et al. 
2009), the results taken together suggest that there are real economic effects associated 
with interbank contagion. 
6. Conclusions and Policy Implications 
This paper exploits an idiosyncratic and sudden shock caused by a large-bank failure, in 
conjunction with precise data on interbank exposures, to test for financial contagion due to 
interbank linkages. First, we find robust evidence that banks with higher interbank 
exposure to the failed bank experience higher deposit withdrawals. To further push on 
causality, we instrument for exposure to the failed bank using the overall lending presence 
in the interbank market (excluding lending to the failed bank) and find similar results. We 
also find that the effect of exposure on deposit withdrawals is nonlinear. Second, we find 38
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the following two main implications of contagion: the magnitude of interbank contagion is 
higher for banks with weaker fundamentals, and interbank linkages among surviving banks 
(apart from linkages to the failed bank) further propagate the shock. These results lend 
support to the theories of financial contagion due to interbank markets (Allen and Gale 
2000, Dasgupta 2004, Brusco and Castiglionesi 2005). Finally, our results suggest that 
there are real economic effects associated with interbank contagion in terms of net bank 
loan supply reduction and lower profits.
Our results have important policy implications, both for prudential regulation and 
for crisis management. Since we find that interbank linkages transmit shocks, regulators 
and banks can devise ex ante risk management systems to curtail excessive exposure to 
single institutions in order to limit the destabilizing effects that could arise from 
idiosyncratic shocks. Another potential solution could be that bank capital requirements 
take into account the concentration risk of large single exposures while taking into 
consideration the costs of limited liquidity provision. Alternatively, there could be limits 
imposed on the extent to which banks could rely on interbank market funding to meet their 
liquidity needs, especially if these are large banks. 
The other interesting policy implication stemming from our results is that systemic 
risk implications of a failure of a large financial institution are very important, especially 
when both the rest of the financial system has (i) a high interbank exposure to the failed 
institution, and (ii) weak fundamentals. Therefore, our paper helps in better clarifying the 
circumstances in which bailouts and/or lender of last resort (LoLR) policies are desirable: 
e.g., if the fundamentals of the banking system are strong, bailout may not be necessary 
since the costs associated with contagion may be lower than the costs associated with 
bailouts (moral hazard and fiscal costs).
28 In contrast, if a highly connected bank fails at a 39
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time when the banking system fundamentals are weak, a bailout may be necessary to 
prevent a systemic crisis.
29
How far can one generalize these conclusions? Given that the analysis is carried out 
in the context of the Indian banking system (primarily cooperative banks), where the 
magnitude of interbank operations is still limited, one could expect that the risk of 
interbank contagion would be higher in banking systems where banks rely heavily on 
interbank operations (more generally in systems in which counterparty default risk is 
important). In addition, one could also expect that in banking systems with higher levels of 
transparency, the role played by bank fundamentals in affecting the magnitude of contagion 
could be even stronger. Finally, the current crisis has dramatically shown the fragility of 
interbank markets. One key area for future research would be to understand the reasons of 
liquidity dry-ups in the interbank markets during the crisis: is it counterparty risk or 
hoarding of liquidity due to future liquidity needs? We believe that answering these 
questions is an important area for future research.  Appendix
Definition of the variables 
x Deposit growth is log (Dt/Dt–1) where Dt is the level of deposits as on December 31, 2001, and Dt–1is the 
level of deposits as on March 31, 2001. 
x Large deposit withdrawals is a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if deposit growth is lower than 
or equal to –12.75% (in effect, 20% of the banks in our sample exhibit large deposit withdrawals).  
x Exposure is the credit outstanding of a bank with the failed bank divided by its total assets as on March 
13, 2001.  
x Dummy high exposure is a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if exposure is higher than or equal to 
9.21% (average plus one standard deviation of exposure if exposure is greater than zero).  
x Dummy medium exposure is a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if exposure is higher than or 
equal to 3.83% (average of exposure if exposure is greater than zero) and lower than 9.21%.  
x Dummy low exposure is a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if exposure is lower than 3.83% and 
higher than 0%. 
x Dummy zero exposure is a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if exposure is equal to 0%. All the 
dummy variables take the value of zero otherwise.  
x High exposure is equal to exposure minus 0.0921 if exposure is greater than or equal to 9.21% and is 
equal to zero if exposure is lower than 9.21% (average plus one standard deviation of exposure if 
exposure is greater than zero).  
x Medium exposure is equal to exposure minus 0.0383 if exposure is greater than or equal to 3.83% and 
lower than 9.21%; is equal to zero if exposure is lower than 3.83% (average of exposure if exposure is 
greater than zero); and is equal to 0.0921 if exposure is greater or equal to 9.21%.  
x Low exposure is equal to exposure if exposure is lower than 3.83%; is equal to zero if exposure is 0; and, 
is equal to 0.0383 if exposure is greater than or equal to 3.83%. 
x Return on assets is the profits of the bank divided by its total assets as on March 31, 2001.  
x Size is the log of total assets of the bank as on March 31, 2001.  
x Media is a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if a report about the bank appeared in newspapers in 
the period between March 13 and 31, 2001, except for one bank.  
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on March 31, 2001.  
x Credit-to-deposit ratio is the total loans of a bank divided by its total deposits as on March 31, 2001.  
x Capital ratio is the book value of shareholder equity plus reserves divided by total assets as on March 31, 
2001.
x Deposit growth (t–1) is log (Dt–1/Dt–2) where Dt–1 is the level of deposits as on March 31, 2001, and Dt–2 
is the level of deposits as on March 31, 2000.  
x Deposit growth immediate is log (Dt–1/Dt–2) where Dt–1 is the level of deposits as on March 31, 2001, and 
Dt–2is the level of deposits as on December 31, 2000.  
x Deposit growth before crisis is log (Dt–1/Dt–2) where Dt–1 is the level of deposits as on December 31, 
2000, and Dt–2is the level of deposits as on March 31, 2000. 
x Correspondent relationship is a dummy variable that equals 1 for banks that a have correspondent 
banking relationship with the failed bank.  
x Distance refers to the physical distance (in Km) between the headquarters of a bank and the headquarters 
of the failed bank. 
x Interbank borrowing is the ratio of deposits held by other cooperative banks to total deposits as on March 
31, 2001.  
x Other interbank lending is the ratio of deposits held in other cooperative banks to total assets as on 
March 31, 2001. 
x Dummy other interbank lending, which is equal to 1 for banks that overall lend in the interbank market 
(excluding lending to the failed bank) as on March 31, 2001, and zero otherwise. 
x Deposit rate change is defined as (DR t–DR t–1)/DR t–1 where DR t is the deposit rate (offered to 
depositors for a deposit of 1-year maturity) prevailing as on March 31, 2002, and DR t–1is deposit rate 
prevailing as on March 31, 2001.  
x Deposit rate 2001 is the rate prevailing as on March 31, 2001, offered to depositors for a deposit of 1-
year maturity. 
x Information release is a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if a bank released information on its 
exposure with the failed bank in its annual report for the year 2001 (the annual report is normally 
released between July and December).  
x # of depositors is the number of depositors in the bank as on March 31, 2000.  
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2000. 
x Capital ratio 2000 is the book value of shareholder equity plus reserves divided by total assets as on 
March 31, 2000. 
x Return on assets 2000 is the profits of the bank divided by its total assets as on March 31, 2000.  
x Loan growth is log (Lt/Lt–1) where Lt is the level of loans as on December 31, 2001, and Lt–1is the level 
of loans as on March 31, 2001. 
x Future Loan growth is log (Lt/Lt–1) where L t is the level of loans as on March 31, 2002, and L t–1is the 
level of loans as on December 31, 2001. 
x Profit growth is log (Pt/Pt–1) where P t is the level of profits as on March 31, 2002, and P t–1is the level of 
profits as on March 31, 2001. 
x Credit deposit ratio growth is defined as log (CDt/CDt–1) where CDt is the credit-deposit ratio as on 
December 31, 2001, and CDt–1is the credit-deposit ratio as on March 31, 2001. 
x Avg District Exposure of other banks is defined as the average exposure of other banks in the district.  
x # of other banks is the number of other banks in the district.
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Vives, X. 2004. Complementarities and Games: New Developments. Journal of Economic1 There is contagion if the failure of a bank causes a significant negative externality to other banks (e.g., high 
levels of deposit withdrawals). For a very similar definition of contagion, see Kaminsky and Reinhart (2000). 
Interbank contagion is the part of contagion due to interbank linkages. For an excellent survey on bank 
contagion, see Kaufman (1994). For a survey on systemic risk in banking, see Bandt et al. (2009); and for a 
survey on financial crisis, see Allen and Gale (2007). 
2 We define large deposit withdrawals as deposit withdrawals exceeding 12.75% of deposits. This, in turn, 
implies that 20% of banks in our sample suffer large deposit withdrawals. Our results are robust to other 
definitions of large deposit withdrawals. 
3 The effect exposure on deposit withdrawals could also be due to the regulator requiring banks with higher 
exposure to reduce their deposit rate, thereby creating difficulty in retaining deposits. However, we find that 
changes in the deposit rate paid by banks are not related to the level of exposure.  
4 See also Flannery (1996), Rochet and Tirole (1996), Aghion et al. (2000), Cifuentes et al. (2005), Diamond 
and Rajan (2005), Iyer and Peydró (2005), and Leitner (2005). 
5 In a similar spirit, Lang and Stulz (1992) investigate the contagion effects of bankruptcy announcements of 
firms. 
6 More recently, Gropp et al. (2005) use the tail properties of distance to default to study contagion risk in 
Europe; they find that contagion risk in Europe is important. Hartmann et al. (2005) study tail risk in major 
banks in the Euro Area and United States; they find that multivariate tail risks among major banks have 
recently increased. 
7 Our study is closer to Furfine (2002). He studies the federal funds market during the LTCM and Russian 
crises and finds that risk premia on overnight lending were largely unaffected and lending volumes increased.  
8 See also Bhattacharya and Gale (1987) and Bhattacharya and Fulghieri (1994).  
9 In the similar spirit Kho et al. (2000) find that the market was able to discern between exposed and non-
exposed banks in the emerging market currency crises.  
10 Statutory Liquidity Ratio (SLR) is the one which every banking company shall maintain in India in the 
form of cash, gold, or unencumbered approved securities an amount which shall not, at the close of business 
on any day, be less than such percentage of the total of its demand and time liabilities in India as on the last 
Friday of the second preceding fortnight. 
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not freely allowed to expand its branch network. It is allowed to open branches in other states/districts only if 
it obtains permission from the central bank subject to the bank meeting certain criteria in terms of deposit 
base and capital adequacy. 
12 Remittance facility is a mechanism to transfer funds to other areas. For example, a bank that does not have 
a branch in location X might use the services of another bank that has a branch at X to transfer funds to that 
location. MMCB had provided remittance facility/check collection services free of charge to other banks. 
13 Bank failures depend on the general economic conditions. For example, the stance of monetary policy 
affects loan defaults and, hence, the probability of bank failures (Rajan 2005<2006 in ref list--which is 
correct?>, Jimenez et al. 2008, Ioannidou et al. 2008, and Maddaloni and Peydró 2009). Therefore, the 
changes in general economic conditions by affecting the likelihood of bank failures make it difficult to 
disentangle the channels of contagion.   
14 Iyer and Puri (2007) exploit the same shock to study the characteristics of depositors that run in one of the 
banks in our sample and find that the runs started only after the failure of MMCB. 
15 Banks headquartered in the region of Kutch were also excluded from the analysis, as there was an 
earthquake that severely affected this region on January 26, 2001 (prior to the MMCB failure). The central 
bank and the state government provided several concessions to banks located in this region to facilitate 
economic growth. Also, there was a huge increase in deposits in banks in this region as aid agencies opened 
accounts to help facilitate the rehabilitation process. 
16 The placement of deposits and dealings between cooperatives and private and public banks is limited. 
There were no private or public banks that had deposits placed with MMCB.
17 We use change in the aggregate level of deposits to construct the measure because data on uninsured versus 
insured level of deposits is not available. Although insured depositors should not have an incentive to run, the 
delays in payment due to partial suspension of convertibility reduces the effectiveness of the deposit 
insurance scheme. Martinez Peria, Soledad<?> and Schmukler (2001) find that insured depositors disciplined 
banks in Argentina, Mexico and Chile. They attribute this behavior to problems in the implementation of the 
deposit insurance scheme. 
18 Banks whose owned funds have been eroded to the extent of 25% or more by un-provided for bad and 
doubtful debts are classified as weak. Banks that have overdues exceeding 50% of loans outstanding, or banks 
not complying with minimum share capital requirements or viability norms prescribed by the central bank, 
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dividend payouts and disposal of assets. 
19 While interpreting the results from the probit, one should keep in mind that we do not have deposit changes 
before the information release by banks, which could have influenced the decision to release information. 
20 We also examined the effect of predicted exposure on deposit growth and found similar results (not 
reported). 
21 From Table 3 and 4, column 3, we find that lending in the interbank market (excluding the lending to the 
failed bank) does not affect deposit withdrawals. 
22 Notice that we normalize the interaction variables of exposure with bank fundamentals. We do this both to 
gain in efficiency and also to reduce the correlations among the regressors: e.g., the variable weak has two 
values (0 and 1); hence, if we would not normalize the interaction variables, then, when weak is equal to 0, 
the interaction term of exposure and weak would equal zero independently of whether exposure is high or 
low. Therefore, without normalizing, then (i) the correlation between weak and exposure × weak would be 
higher and (ii) we would not differentiate between weak banks with higher vs. weak banks with lower 
exposure. 
23From column 6, we find that (at 11%) the effect of exposure on deposit growth is higher for banks with 
lower capital-to-asset ratio. 
24 Notice that we use the number of depositors as on March 31, 2000, because the number of depositors as on 
March 31, 2001, is partially determined by the levels of exposure to the failed bank. 
25 From column 5, we find (at 14%) that the effect of exposure on large deposit withdrawals is higher for 
smaller banks. 
26 We also find similar results if we analyze large deposit withdrawals.  
27 Notice that we do not include weak banks in the loan growth regressions, because these banks have 
regulatory restrictions that prevent them from freely adjusting their loan portfolio (our results are robust, even 
if we run the estimations including weak banks). 
28 See also Goodfriend and King (1988), Rochet and Tirole (1996), Holmström and Tirole (1998), Acharya 
and Yorulmazer (2007a,b). 
29 The following statement made by Ben Bernanke, Chairman of the Federal Reserve in October 2008, after 
Lehman Brothers’ failure when the U.S economy was in a downturn highlights that bailouts may be necessary 
to prevent a systemic crisis especially when the banking system fundamentals are weak. He said, “In the 
49
ECB
Working Paper Series No 1147
January 2010future, the Treasury will have greater resources available to prevent the failure of a financial institution when 
such a failure would pose unacceptable risks to the financial system as a whole.” 
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Summary statistics 
This table provides summary statistics for the banks in the sample. Deposit growth is log (Dt/Dt–1) where Dt is the level of 
deposits as on December 31, 2001, and Dt–1is the level of deposits as on March 31, 2001. Large deposit withdrawals is a dummy 
variable that takes the value of 1 if deposit growth is lower than or equal to –12.75% (which implies that 20% of the observations
exhibit large deposit withdrawals). Exposure is the credit outstanding of a bank with the failed bank divided by its total assets as 
on March 13, 2001. Return on assets is the profits of the bank divided by its total assets. Size is the log of total assets of the bank. 
Media is a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if a report about the bank appeared in newspapers in the period between 
March 13 and 31, 2001. Weak is a dummy variable that takes the value 1 when a bank is classified as weak by the central bank. 
Credit-to-deposit ratio is the total loans of a bank divided by its total deposits. Capital ratio is the book value of shareholder 
equity plus reserves divided by total assets.Deposit growth (t–1) is log (Dt–1/Dt–2) where Dt–1 is the level of deposits as on March 
31, 2001, and Dt–2 is the level of deposits as on March 31, 2000. Correspondent relationship is a dummy variable that equals 1 for 
banks that a have correspondent banking relationship with the failed bank. Distance refers to the physical distance (in Km) 
between the headquarters of a bank and the headquarters of the failed bank. Interbank borrowing is the ratio of deposits held by 
other cooperative banks to total deposits as on March 31, 2001. Other interbank lending is the ratio of deposits held in other 
cooperative banks to total assets as on March 31, 2001. Deposit rate change is defined as (DRt–DRt–1)/DRt–1 where DRt is the 
deposit rate (offered to depositors for a deposit of 1-year maturity) prevailing as on March 31, 2002, and DRt–1is the deposit rate 
prevailing as on March 31, 2001. Deposit rate 2001 is the rate prevailing as on March 31, 2001, offered to depositors for a 
deposit of 1-year maturity. Information release is a dummy that takes the value of 1 if the bank released information on its 
exposure with the failed bank in the year 2001 annual report. Loan growth is defined as log (Lt/Lt–1) where Lt is the level of loans 
as on December 31, 2001, and Lt–1 is the level of loans as on March 31, 2001. Profit growth is log (Pt/Pt–1) where Pt is the level of 
profits as on March 31, 2002, and Pt–1is the level of profits as on March 31, 2001. # of depositors is the number of depositors in 
the bank as on March 31, 2000. All balance sheet variables are measured as on March 31, 2001, unless stated. Dummy variables 
take the value of 0 otherwise. 
Mean Median  Standard
Deviation Min Max  N 
Deposit  growth  -0.049 -0.039 0.133 -0.506 0.508  142 
Large deposit withdrawals  0.197  0  0.399  0  1  142 
Exposure  0.032  0.005  0.051 0 0.235  142 
Return on assets  0.010  0.009  0.008  -0.036  0.040  142 
Size 9.165  9.097  0.775  7.993  12.088  142 
Media 0.070  0  0.256  0  1  142 
Weak 0.091  0  0.289  0  1  142 
Credit-to-deposit  ratio  0.636 0.624 0.160 0.262 1.044  142 
Capital  ratio  0.112 0.107 0.039 0.039 0.291  142 
Deposit growth (t–1)  0.141 0.128 0.128 -0.215 0.586  142 
Correspondent relationship  0.464  0  0.500  0  1  142 
Distance 121  79  98  0  345  142 
Interbank  borrowing  0.008 0 0.025 0 0.155  124 
Other interbank lending  0.029  0.002  0.053  0  0.258  121 
Deposit rate change  0.044  0  0.103  -0.251  0.310  70 
Deposit rate 2001  0.087  0.09  0.012  0.055  0.12  84 
Information release  0.316  0  0.466  0  1  142 
Loan growth   -0.055  -0.042  0.144  -0.518  0.431  129 
Profit  growth    -0.104 0.034 0.503 -1.888 1.863  128 
# of depositors  45,897  40,013  24,822  8,000  139,611  121 
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Ex ante differences in bank fundamentals between banks with high versus low exposure 
This table presents the results of a two-sided t-test of the mean of bank fundamentals between banks with high levels of exposure 
versus banks with low level of exposure. To distinguish between high vs. low exposure, in Table 4A, high exposure refers to 
banks with the exposure higher than or equal to 9.21% (average plus one standard deviation of exposure if exposure is positive),
whereas Non-high exposure refers to banks with exposure lower than 9.21%. By contrast, Table 4B uses banks with positive 
exposure versus banks with zero exposure. The bank fundamentals are the following: (i) Return on assets is the profits of the 
bank divided by its total assets; (ii) Size is the log of total assets of the bank, and (iii) Deposit rate is the rate prevailing as on 
March 31, 2001, offered to depositors for a deposit of 1-year maturity. All balance sheet variables are measured as on March 31,
2001, unless stated. *, **, *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
Return on assets    Size    Deposit rate 
  ( 1 )    ( 2 )    ( 3) 
Table 4a         
Non-High exposure         
Mean 0.0105    9.1734    0.0872 
Standard error  (0.0007)   (0.0729)   (0.0014) 
N 122   122    68 
         
High exposure         
Mean 0.0114    9.1142    0.0896 
Standard error  (0.0016)   (0.1280)   (0.0032) 
N 20   20   16 
         
Tests for differences between 
means (p-values)          
Low vs. High exposure   0.6525    0.7529    0.4740 
Table 4b         
Zero exposure         
Mean 0.0115    8.9822    0.0875 
Standard error  (0.0014)   (0.2001)   (0.0055) 
N 21   21   8 
         
Positive exposure         
Mean 0.0105    9.1968    0.0876 
Standard error  (0.0007)   (0.0680)   (0.0013) 
N 121   121    76 
         
Tests for differences between 
means (p-values)          
Zero vs. Positive exposure   0.6145    0.2431    0.9661 
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Effect of exposure on deposit growth
This table presents results of OLS regressions where the dependent variable is deposit growth. Deposit growth is log (Dt/Dt–1)
where Dt is the level of deposits as on December 31, 2001, and Dt–1 is the level of deposits as on March 31, 2001. Exposure is the 
credit outstanding of a bank with the failed bank divided by its total assets as on March 13, 2001. Dummy high exposure is a 
dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if exposure is higher than or equal to 9.21% (average plus one standard deviation of 
exposure if exposure is positive). Dummy zero exposure is a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if exposure is equal to 0%. 
Other interbank lending is the ratio of deposits held in other cooperative banks to total assets as on March 31, 2001. Size is the 
log of total assets of the bank. Return on assets is the profits of the bank divided by its total assets. Media is a dummy variable 
that takes the value of 1 if a report about the bank appeared in newspapers in the period between March 13 and 31, March 2001. 
Weak is a dummy variable that takes the value 1 when a bank is classified as weak by the central bank. Credit-to-deposit ratio is 
the total loans of a bank divided by its total deposits. Capital ratio is the book value of shareholder equity plus reserves divided 
by total assets. Correspondent relationship is a dummy variable that equals 1 for banks that a have correspondent banking 
relationship with the failed bank. Distance refers to the physical distance (in Km) between the headquarters of a bank and the 
headquarters of the failed bank. Deposit growth (t–1) is log (Dt–1/Dt–2) where Dt–1 is the level of deposits as on March 31, 2001, 
and Dt–2is the level of deposits as on March 31, 2000. District controls are dummy variables that take the value of 1 if the bank is 
headquartered in a district. There are 16 different districts in our sample. All balance sheet variables are measured as on March
31, 2001, unless stated. Dummy variables take the value of 0 otherwise. Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors are in 
parentheses. Unless otherwise stated, regressions are estimated with constants, but the coefficients are not reported. *, **, *** 




  ( 1 )  ( 2 )  ( 3 )  ( 4 )  ( 5 ) 
Exposure     -0.712***     -0.670***  -0.636**     
(0.262) (0.231)  (0.317)     
Dummy high exposure           -0.086** 
        (0.038) 
Dummy zero exposure          0.062**   
       (0.031)   
Other interbank lending         -0.114     
     (0.150)     
Size      -0.015      -0.018     -0.015     -0.017     -0.018 
  (0.016)  (0.013)  (0.017) (0.015) (0.016) 
Return on assets     3.333**  1.776*    3.318**  2.655*    3.254** 
    (1.350)  (1.053)  (1.478) (1.392) (1.363) 
Media     -0.193***     -0.163***     -0.177***     -0.189***     -0.193*** 
    (0.047)  (0.045)  (0.051) (0.048) (0.045) 
Weak  -0.069*  -0.068*     -0.071     -0.050  -0.061 
  (0.038)  (0.037)     (0.045)  (0.040)  (0.037) 
Credit-to-deposit ratio    -0.168**  -0.154*    -0.131**  -0.110    -0.181** 
 (0.081)  (0.079)    (0.075)  (0.071)  (0.086) 
Capital ratio      -0.111  0.018      0.082  -0.157  -0.041 
   (0.246)  (0.244)   (0.256)   (0.249)  (0.251) 
Correspondent  relationship    0.016  0.023 0.020 0.018 
    (0.018)   (0.021)  (0.020)   (0.019) 
Distance    -0.000     
      (0.000)     
Deposit growth (t–1)      0.217**       
      (0.101)     
Constant  0.222  0.210  0.164 0.168 0.231 
  0.185    (0.148)  (0.172) (0.175) (0.185) 
District  controls  yes  no  yes yes yes 
Number of banks  142  142  121  142  142 
Adj./pseudo R-squared  0.283  0.348  0.326 0.234 0.255 
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The effect of exposure on large deposit withdrawals 
This table presents results of probits where the dependent variable is large deposit withdrawals. Large deposit withdrawals is a 
dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if deposit growth is lower than or equal to -12.75% (which implies that 20% of the 
observations exhibit large deposit withdrawals). Exposure is the credit outstanding of a bank with the failed bank divided by its 
total assets as on March 13, 2001. Dummy high exposure is a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if exposure is higher than 
or equal to 9.21% (average plus one standard deviation of exposure if exposure is positive). Dummy zero exposure is a dummy 
variable that takes the value of 1 if exposure is equal to 0%. Other interbank lending is the ratio of deposits held in other 
cooperative banks to total assets as on March 31, 2001. Size is the log of total assets of the bank. Return on assets is the profits of 
the bank divided by its total assets. Media is a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if a report about the bank appeared in 
newspapers in the period between March 13 and 31, March 2001. Weak is a dummy variable that takes the value 1 when a bank is 
classified as weak by the central bank. Credit-to-deposit ratio is the total loans of a bank divided by its total deposits. Capital 
ratio is the book value of shareholder equity plus reserves divided by total assets. Correspondent relationship is a dummy 
variable that equals 1 for banks that a have correspondent banking relationship with the failed bank. Distance refers to the 
physical distance (in Km) between the headquarters of a bank and the headquarters of the failed bank. Deposit growth (t–1) is log 
(Dt–1/Dt–2) where Dt–1 is the level of deposits as on March 31, 2001, and Dt–2 is the level of deposits as on March 31, 2000. 
District controls are dummy variables that take the value of 1 if the bank is headquartered in a district. There are 16 different
districts in our sample. All balance sheet variables are measured as on March 31, 2001, unless stated. Dummy variables take the
value of 0 otherwise. Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors are in parentheses. In column 2, 3, 4, and 5 standard errors are
clustered at the district level. Unless otherwise stated, regressions are estimated with constants, but the coefficients are not




  ( 1 )  ( 2 )  ( 3 )  ( 4 )  ( 5 ) 
Exposure      10.328***      8.357***     9.624***     
 (3.726)  (2.938)  (3.455)     
Dummy high exposure           1.068***   
       (0.387)   
Dummy zero exposure             -1.350*** 
         (0.226) 
Other interbank lending      0.770     
     (1.948)     
Size  -0.095      -0.048  0.016  -0.041     -0.050 
  (0.237)  (0.168)  (0.187) (0.152) (0.139) 
Return on assets   -39.193*     -33.977**   -36.013*    -32.098**  -25.013 
  (20.391)   (15.863)   (20.415)  (16.250)   (18.681) 
Media    1.352**     1.503***     1.596***     1.710***     1.836*** 
 (0.619)  (0.274)  (0.382)    (0.237)  (0.317) 
Weak     1.595***    0.840**     0.872**    0.851**   0.690** 
  (0.513)    (0.346)  (0.815) (0.363) (0.287) 
Credit-to-deposit ratio  1.305   1.465*   1.383*  1.170     -0.119 
    (0.957)  (0.813)  (0.815) (0.820) (0.715) 
Capital ratio  0.154      -0.385  1.815  0.691  2.249 
   (3.995)  (2.550)  (3.194)  (0.251)   (2.808) 
Correspondent relationship        -0.451  -0.426  -0.286  -0.199 
   (0.335)  (0.407)  (0.297)    (0.309) 
Distance      0.003* 0.002 0.002 0.002 
   (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001)    (0.001) 
Deposit growth (t–1)       -1.871***       
         (0.687)       
District controls  yes   no  no  no  no 
Number of banks  112  142  121  142  142 
Adj./pseudo R-squared  0.314  0.227  0.240 0.189 0.174 
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The nonlinear effect of exposure on deposit withdrawals 
Column 1 and 2 present the results of an OLS regression where the dependent variable is deposit growth. Column 3 and 4 present 
the results of a probit where the dependent variable is large deposit withdrawals. Deposit growth is log (Dt/Dt–1) where Dt is the 
level of deposits as on December 31, 2001, and Dt–1is the level of deposits as on March 31, 2001. Large deposit withdrawals is a 
dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if deposit growth is lower than or equal to –12.75% (which implies that 20% of the 
observations exhibit large deposit withdrawals). High exposure is equal to exposure minus 0.0921 if exposure is greater than or 
equal to 9.21% and is equal to 0 if exposure is lower than 9.21% (average plus one standard deviation of exposure if exposure is
positive). Medium exposure is equal to exposure minus 0.0383 if exposure is greater than or equal to 3.83% and lower than 
9.21%; it is equal to 0 if exposure is lower than 3.83% (average of exposure if exposure is positive); and it is equal to 0.0921 if 
exposure is greater than or equal to 9.21%. Low exposure is equal to exposure if exposure is lower than 3.83%; it is equal to zero 
if exposure is 0; and it is equal to 0.0383 if exposure is greater than or equal to 3.83%. Dummy zero exposure is a dummy 
variable that takes the value of 1 if exposure is equal to 0%. All the independent variables are described in the Appendix. All
balance sheet variables are measured as on March 31, 2000, unless otherwise stated. Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors are
in parentheses. In column 3 and 4 standard errors are clustered at the district level. Unless otherwise stated, regressions are
estimated with constants, but the coefficients are not reported. *, **, *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% 







  Probit 
 Large dep. 
withdrawals 
  Probit 
 Large dep. 
withdrawals 
    ( 1 )    ( 2 )    ( 3 )    ( 4 ) 
High exposure  -1.325**   -1.192*   21.734***   19.851*** 
   (0.628)   (0.637)   (7.124)   (6.820) 
Medium exposure   -1.901*   -1.474   -5.873   -14.625 
   (1.082)   (1.095)   (18.090)   (21.595) 
Low exposure   0.615   1.250   0.371   -10.058 
   (1.364)   (1.192)   (10.903)    (9.870) 
Dummy zero exposure     0.056*   -1.332*** 
 (0.033)   (0.145) 
Size   -0.161   -0.014   -0.049   -0.061 
   (0.169)   (0.016)   (0.145)   (0.128) 
Return on assets   3.260**   2.857**   -34.535**   -28.726 
   (1.364)   (1.414)   (16.738)   (18.999) 
Media   -0.190***   -0.195***   1.772***   2.073*** 
   (0.049)   (0.050)   (0.269)   (0.288) 
Weak   -0.062   -0.063   0.883**    0.957** 
   (0.038)   (0.039)   (0.361)    (0.381) 
Credit-to-deposit ratio   -0.174**   -0.154**   1.212    0.820 
   (0.085)   (0.077)   (0.895)    (0.926) 
Capital ratio   -0.111   -0.125   1.028    0.112 
   (0.259)   (0.252)   (2.707)    (3.104) 
Correspondent relationship   0.016   0.027   -0.397   -0.539 
   (0.020)   (0.020)   (0.316)    (0.347) 
Distance     0.003*    0.002 
 (0.001)    (0.001) 
F test of equality of coefficients 
of high versus low exposure    2.43    3.83*    2.45    4.81** 
District controls    yes    yes     no     no 
Number of banks    142    142    142    142 
Adj./pseudo R-squared   0.260    0.273    0.252    0.286 
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The immediate effect of exposure on deposit growth 
This table presents results of OLS regressions where the dependent variables are Deposit growth immediate and Deposit growth 
before crisis. Deposit growth immediate is log (Dt–1/Dt–2) where Dt–1 is the level of deposits as on March 31, 2001, and Dt–2 is the 
level of deposits as on December 31, 2000. Deposit growth before crisis is log (Dt–1/Dt–2) where Dt–1 is the level of deposits as on 
December 31, 2000, and Dt–2 is the level of deposits as on March 31, 2000. Exposure is the credit outstanding of a bank with the 
failed bank divided by its total assets as on March 13, 2001. Dummy high exposure is a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 
if exposure is higher than or equal to 9.21%. High exposure is equal to exposure minus 0.0921 if exposure is greater than or equal 
to 9.21% and is equal to 0 if exposure is lower than 9.21% (average plus one standard deviation of exposure if exposure is 
positive). Medium exposure is equal to exposure minus 0.0383 if exposure is greater than or equal to 3.83% and lower than 
9.21%; it is equal to 0 if exposure is lower than 3.83% (average of exposure if exposure is positive); and it is equal to 0.0921 if 
exposure is greater than or equal to 9.21%. Low exposure is equal to exposure if exposure is lower than 3.83%; it is equal to 0 if 
exposure is 0; and it is equal to 0.0383 if exposure is greater than or equal to 3.83%. All the independent variables are described 
in the Appendix. All balance sheet variables are measured as on March 31, 2000, unless otherwise stated. Heteroskedasticity-
robust standard errors are in parentheses. Unless otherwise stated, regressions are estimated with constants, but the coefficients 
are not reported. *, **, *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
 
  
                        OLS  
                Deposit growth immediate 
                    
    OLS  
Deposit growth  
before crisis 
  ( 1 )    ( 2 )   (3)   ( 4 ) 
Exposure -0.184*          
 (0.098)          
Dummy high exposure        -0.029**      
     (0.013)      
High exposure              -0.555***    0.046 
         (0.172)    (0.218) 
Medium exposure           0.232    -0.208 
         (0.550)    (0.946) 
Low exposure           0.457    0.255 
         (0.696)    (1.022) 
Media     -0.103***       -0.104***       -0.105***    -0.034 
 (0.029)    (0.028)    (0.016)    (0.048) 
Weak -0.004    -0.003    -0.004    0.008 
 (0.013)    (0.013)    (0.014)    (0.033) 
Credit-to-deposit ratio 2000  -0.010    -0.016    -0.020       0.190*** 
 (0.032)    (0.032)    (0.033)    (0.049) 
Capital ratio 2000  0.025    0.027    0.023       -0.637*** 
 (0.100)    (0.097)    (0.099)    (0.198) 
Return on assets 2000  0.460    0.496    0.495       4.022*** 
 (0.682)    (0.672)    (0.672)    (1.303) 
Size 2000  -0.005    -0.005    -0.005    -0.014 
 (0.006)    (0.006)    (0.006)    (0.013) 
Correspondent relationship  -0.002    -0.002    -0.001    0.003 
 (0.010)    (0.010)    (0.010)    (0.017) 
District controls  yes    yes    yes    yes 
Number of banks  131    131    131    131 
Adj./pseudo R-squared 0.439    0.441    0.462    0.246 
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  Robustness 
Deposit rate change is defined as (DRt–DRt–1)/ DRt–1 where DRt is the deposit rate (offered to depositors for a deposit of 1-year 
maturity) prevailing as on March 31, 2002, and DR t–1 is the deposit rate prevailing as on March 31, 2001. Information release is a 
dummy that takes the value of 1 if the bank released information on its exposure with the failed bank in the year 2001 annual report. In 
column 3, the sample is restricted to banks with information release equal to 0. In column 4, we use an instrument for exposure. The 
instrument is dummy other interbank lending, which is equal to 1 for banks that overall lend in the interbank market (excluding lending 
to the failed bank) as on March 31, 2001, and 0 otherwise. Column 4 presents the first stage regression where the dependent variable is 
exposure. In column 5, we analyze the impact of the component of exposure predicted by the instrument on large deposit withdrawals.
All the independent variables are described in the Appendix. All balance sheet variables are measured as on March 31, 2001, unless 
stated. Dummy variables take the value of 0 otherwise. Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors are in parentheses. In column 2 and 3 
standard errors are clustered at the district level. Unless otherwise stated, regressions are estimated with constants, but the coefficients 
are not reported. *, **, *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 







   Exposure  Large dep. 
withdrawals 
( 1 )  (2) (3)  (4) (5)
Exposure -0.041     -5.659**     9.207***    18.729**
(0.305)  (2.735)  (2.873)        (9.531) 
Dummy other interbank lending       0.028***   
   (0.008) 
Size  -0.034*  0.480  0.103       -0.003     0.002 
(0.019)  (0.294)  (0.269)       (0.006)     (0.191) 
Return on assets     -1.700  -0.105  -65.515       -0.178  -34.263** 
(1.396)  (9.827)  (13.592)       (0.604)     (16.880) 
Media 0.095     -1.365***     1.221***       -0.003   1.478*** 
(0.064)      (0.418)  (0.348)       (0.009)      (0.497) 
Weak   -0.123*  -0.234   0.841*       -0.016***    0.885*** 
(0.049)  (0.422)  (0.470)       (0.005)      (0.285) 
Credit-to-deposit ratio  -0.037  -0.617    1.454**       -0.053***  1.758** 
(0.081)  (0.772)  (0.635)       (0.019)      (0.839) 
Capital ratio  0.770  -3.410  2.296       0.041     1.589 
(0.576)  (3.742)  (4.104)       (0.061)      (2.731) 
Correspondent relationship  0.008     1.038***  -0.413     0.022**     -0.564 
(0.027)  (0.201)   (0.337)       (0.009)      (0.466) 
Deposit growth (t–1) 0.169
(0.175) 
Distance    -0.000  0.001       0.000     0.001 
  (0.001)   (0.001)       (0.000)      (0.002) 
District controls  yes  no  no    no no
Number of banks  70  142  97    121 121
Adj./pseudo R-squared 0.351 0.180  0.225   
T-statistic of exclusion 
hypothesis is 3.46*** 
ECB
Working Paper Series No 1147
January 2010 57Table 8 
The effect of interbank linkages among banks (excluding the linkage with the failed bank) 
Columns 1, 2, and 5 present results of an OLS regression where the dependent variable is deposit growth. Columns 3 and 6 
present results of a probit where the dependent variable is large deposit withdrawals. Column 4 presents results of an OLS 
regression where the dependent variable is interbank borrowing. In columns 5 and 6, the sample is limited to banks that have zero 
interbank borrowing (the sample of banks that has only retail depositors). Deposit growth is log (Dt/Dt–1) where Dt is the level of 
deposits as on December 31, 2001, and Dt–1is the level of deposits as on March 31, 2001. Large deposit withdrawals is a dummy 
variable that takes the value of 1 if deposit growth is lower than or equal to –12.75% (which implies that 20% of the observations
exhibit large deposit withdrawals). The main independent variables are interbank borrowing, exposure and an interaction variable 
of these two variables. Interbank borrowing is the ratio of deposits held by other cooperative banks to total deposits as on March 
31, 2001. Exposure is the credit outstanding of a bank with the failed bank divided by its total assets as on March 13, 2001. 
Interbank borrowing x Exposure is the interaction of interbank borrowing and Exposure. All the independent variables are 
described in the Appendix. All balance sheet variables are measured as on March 31, 2001, except in column 4. 
Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors are in parentheses. In columns 3 and 6 standard errors are clustered at the district level. 
Unless otherwise stated, regressions are estimated with constants, but the coefficients are not reported. *, **, *** denote 



















  ( 1 )  ( 2 )  ( 3 )  ( 4 )  ( 5 )  ( 6 ) 
Exposure  -0.676**  -0.539*   9.642***    -0.053  -0.611*   9.959*** 
   (0.292)   (0.300)   (3.367)  (0.038)  (0.320)   (3.889) 
Size   -0.007   -0.003   -0.104    0.021  -0.269 
   (0.017)   (0.017)   (0.255)    (0.023)   (0.308) 
Return on assets   3.167**   3.077*   -32.181*      4.046**  -33.715* 
   (1.562)   (1.586)   (18.784)    (1.824)   (20.411) 
Media   -0.169***   -0.172***   1.431***    0.022  -0.131*   0.781*** 
   (0.054)   (0.052)   (0.355)    (0.017)  (0.078)   (0.298) 
Weak   -0.080   -0.087   1.088***    -0.004  -0.054   0.775 
   (0.051)   (0.053)   (0.407)  (0.007)  (0.073)   (0.508) 
Credit-to-deposit ratio   -0.115   -0.093   0.920      -0.072   1.056 
   (0.071)   (0.069)   (0.816)    (0.079)   (0.827) 
Capital ratio   0.027    0.057   3.081    -0.028   3.139 
   (0.261)   (0.259)   (2.751)     (0.265)   (3.375) 
Correspondent relationship   0.012    0.010   -0.259    0.004   -0.205 
   (0.022)   (0.022)   (0.384)     (0.023)   (0.382) 
Interbank borrowing   -0.436   -0.004   6.015       
   (0.478)   (0.403)   (3.821)       
Interbank borrowing x Exposure    -82.330***  715.68***       
     (22.310)   (155.03)       
Distance       0.002        0.001 
       (0.001)        (0.001) 
Size 2000           0.009     
       (0.004)    
Credit-to-deposit ratio 2000        0.003     
      (0.01)    
Capital ratio 2000        -0.016     
        (0.041)    
Return on assets 2000        -0.037     
        (0.253)    
District  controls  yes yes no yes yes no 
Number of banks  124  124  124  123  96  96 
Adj./pseudo R-squared  0.336 0.380 0.292 0.150 0.235 0.173 
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Interaction effects of exposure with bank fundamentals
 Columns 1, 2, and 5 present results of a probit where the dependent variable is large deposit withdrawals. Columns 3, 4, and 6 
present results of the OLS regression where the dependent variable is deposit growth. Column 7 presents the results for the 
sample of banks that do not have other banks as depositors (the sample of banks that has only retail depositors). Deposit growth 
is log (Dt/Dt–1) where Dt is the level of deposits as on December 31, 2001, and Dt–1 is the level of deposits as on March 31, 2001. 
Large deposit withdrawals is a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if deposit growth is lower than or equal to –12.75% 
(which implies that 20% of the observations exhibit large deposit withdrawals). The main independent variables are exposure and
interaction variables of exposure with variables that proxy for bank fundamentals, where exposure is the credit outstanding of a 
bank with the failed bank divided by its total assets as on March 13, 2001. All the independent variables are described in the 
Appendix. All balance sheet variables are measured as on March 31, 2001, unless stated. Heteroskedasticity-robust standard 
errors are in parentheses. In columns 1, 2, and 5 standard errors are clustered at the district level. The coefficient for # of
depositors is scaled up by 100,000. Unless otherwise stated, regressions are estimated with constants, but the coefficients are not 






















  ( 1 )  ( 2 )  ( 3 )  ( 4 )  ( 5 )    ( 6 )    (7) 
Exposure   7.620**   9.57**  -1.521***   -0.542*   99.505**  -1.039***  -1.037***
    (3.22)   (4.08)   (0.26)   (0.27)   (46.47)   (0.22)  (0.262) 
Size   -0.100  -0.515**  0.100***   0.090**  -0.711***   0.094***  0.104***
    (0.14)   (0.25)   (0.03)   (0.03)   (0.19)   (0.03)  (0.034) 
Return on assets   -32.939**  -63.904***  4.439***   4.179**  -79.175***   4.327***  4.434**
    (16.05)   (15.95)   (1.65)   (1.77)   (18.12)   (1.54)  (2.066) 
Media   1.842***   2.128***   -0.136**  -0.135**  2.036***  -0.149**  -0.150*
    (0.33)   (0.40)   (0.06)   (0.06)   (0.46)   (0.05)  (0.075) 
Weak  0.855**   1.149***  -0.299***  -0.057   33.880**  -0.306***  -0.295***
    (0.33)   (0.43)   (0.02)   (0.07)   (16.41)   (0.02)  (0.021) 
Credit-to-deposit ratio    1.139   0.870   -0.064  -0.079   0.738  -0.047  -0.070
    (0.76)   (0.63)   (0.06)   (0.07)   (0.83)   (0.05)  (0.06) 
Capital ratio    0.362   2.052   0.049   0.177   -1.556   0.244  0.275
    (3.71)   (3.41)   (0.21)   (0.27)   (5.10)   (0.25)  (0.282) 
Correspondent relationship   -0.255  -0.445   -0.011  -0.008   -0.186   -0.007  0.002
    (0.35)   (0.42)   (0.02)   (0.02)   (0.53)   (0.01)  (0.020) 
Distance  0.003**   0.003*       0.002     
    (0.00)   (0.002)       (0.002)   
# of depositors     0.92  -0.17**  -0.19**   0.000  -0.13**  -0.15**
     (0.80)  (0.077)   (0.082)   (0.00)  (0.06)  (0.06) 
Interbank borrowing      -0.615  -0.423   6.916  -0.117 
       (0.45)   (0.41)   (6.08)   (0.35) 
Interbank borrowing x Exposure          812.94***  -76.48*** 
           (299.35)  (18.04) 
Capital ratio x Exposure  -0.392***        -0.569**  0.020  0.027*
   (0.111)         (0.27)  (0.01)  (0.015) 
# of depositors x Exposure     0.325**       0.523**  -0.037***  -0.038***
     (0.163)       (0.22)  (0.01)  (0.014) 
Weak x Exposure      -0.152***     15.403**  -0.148***  -0.150***
       (0.01)     (7.62)  (0.01)  (0.01) 
Size x Exposure         0.019   -0.343  0.058***  0.057***
         (0.01)   (0.23)  (0.01)  (0.01) 
District controls  no     no    yes    yes    no   yes  yes 
Number of banks  142    121    104    104    104   104  87
Adj./pseudo R-squared  0.240    0.287    0.471   0.339   0.445   0.576  0.550
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The effect of exposure on loan growth and profitability
This table presents results of OLS regressions where the dependent variables are Loan growth, Credit-deposit ratio growth, 
and Profit growth. Loan growth is defined as log (Lt/Lt–1) where Lt is the level of loans as on December 31, 2001, and  Lt–1is 
the level of loans as on March 31, 2001. Credit deposit ratio growth is defined as log (CDt/CDt–1) where CDt is the credit-
deposit ratio as on December 31, 2001, and CDt–1is the credit-deposit ratio as on March 31, 2001. Profit growth is log (Pt/Pt–
1) where Pt is the level of profits as on March 31, 2002, and Pt–1is the level of profits as on March 31, 2001. Exposure is the 
credit outstanding of a bank with the failed bank divided by its total assets as on March 13, 2001. All the independent 
variables are described in the Appendix. All balance sheet variables are measured as on March 31, 2001, unless otherwise 
stated. Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors are in parentheses. Unless otherwise stated, regressions are estimated with 









   Profit 
   growth  
Profit
growth
( 1 )  ( 2 )  (3)   (4)   ( 5 ) 
Exposure -0.503**  -0.445**   0.191   -3.755***      -3.040*** 
    (0.167)    (0.215)      (0.308)    (0.778)  (0.805) 
Return on assets      0.714    -0.108     -4.402** 
    (2.744)    (1.593)      (2.052) 
Capital ratio     -0.115   -0.014      0.213    -0.682  -0.351
    (0.422)    (0.333)      (0.318)     (1.157)  (1.150) 
Credit-to-deposit ratio     -0.040   -0.010      -0.969***      -0.977*** 
    (0.078)    (0.102)       (0.302)  (0.304) 
Size     0.016    0.006      0.014    -0.023  -0.007
    (0.019)    (0.018)      (0.016)     (0.065)  (0.063) 
Media  -0.124**   -0.131**   0.051    -0.204  -0.180
    (0.022)    (0.058)      (0.059)     (0.188)  (0.230) 
Correspondent relationship     -0.004    0.014      0.003     0.095    0.140* 
    (0.018)    (0.029)      (0.033)     (0.080)  (0.074) 
Distance     0.0006***         0.000 
(0.0001)         (0.000) 
Weak       -0.389**   -0.385* 
         (0.193)  (0.222) 
District controls  no  yes  yes   no   yes 
Number of banks  129  129  129  128 128
Adj./pseudo R-squared 0.271 0.232  0.147  0.230 0.323
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The real effects of interbank contagion 
This table presents results of OLS regressions where the dependent variables are Deposit growth, Loan growth, Future loan growth, and 
Profit growth. Deposit growth is log (Dt/Dt–1) where Dt is the level of deposits as on December 31, 2001, and Dt–1is the level of deposits 
as on March 31, 2001. Loan growth is defined as log (Lt/Lt–1) where Lt is the level of loans as on December 31, 2001, and Lt–1is the level 
of loans as on March 31, 2001. Future loan growth is defined as log (Lt/Lt–1) where Lt is the level of loans as on March 31, 2002, and Lt–
1is the level of loans as on December 31, 2001. Profit growth is log (Pt/Pt–1) where Pt is the level of profits as on March 31, 2002, and Pt–
1 is the level of profits as on March 31, 2001. Dummy Low exposure is equal to 1 if exposure is lower than or equal to 3.83%, and 0 
otherwise. Avg district exposure of other banks is defined as the average exposure of other banks in the same district. # of other banks is 
the number of other banks in the same district. All the independent variables are described in the Appendix. All balance sheet variables 
are measured as on March 31, 2001, unless otherwise stated. Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors clustered at district level are 
reported in parentheses. Unless otherwise stated, regressions are estimated with constants, but the coefficients are not reported. *, **, *** 














  ( 1 )  ( 2 )  (3) (4)   (5) ( 6 ) 
Dummy low exposure   0.077*** 0.031 0.031 -0.012  -0.034  0.323
 (0.013)  (0.025)  (0.026) (0.033) (0.057) (0.200) 
Avg district exposure of other banks    -0.783**  -0.786**  -0.949  -0.224  -1.794 
   (0.276)  (0.298) (0.684) (0.392) (2.714) 
Dummy low exposure x Avg district exposure oth    1.275*  1.282* 1.188  1.809  -0.342
   (0.636)  (0.649) (0.741) (2.348) (4.271) 
Credit-to-deposit ratio  -0.107  -0.106  -0.106 -0.009 0.107  -0.883***
 (0.087)  (0.086)  (0.085) (0.081) (0.230) (0.259) 
Capital ratio  -0.303  -0.270  -0.269 -0.137 0.251  -0.766
 (0.203)  (0.207)  (0.208) (0.430) (0.573) (1.109) 
Return on assets  2.809***  2.737***   2.753***  -0.201  -4.072  -2.582
 (0.772)  (0.782)  (0.830) (0.263) (4.562) (5.930) 
Size -0.014**  -0.011*  -0.011* 0.012  0.004  -0.022
 (0.005)  (0.005)  (0.005) (0.019) (0.014) (0.075) 
Media -0.201***  -0.203***  -0.203*** -0.121*** -0.038  -0.199
 (0.032)  (0.032)  (0.032) (0.017) (0.043) (0.179) 
Correspondent relationship  0.007   0.008  0.008 0.002 0.057 0.082
 (0.010)    (0.009)  (0.009) (0.019) (0.048) (0.088) 
Distance -0.000  -0.000  -0.000 0.000  -0.000 -0.000
(0.000)   (0.000)  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Weak -0.062**  -0.066**  -0.066**     -0.342*
 (0.024)    (0.026)  (0.026)  (0.170) 
# of other banks      -0.000 0.003  0.003  -0.000
     (0.001)  (0.002) (0.003)  (0.008) 
District controls  no  no  no no no no
Number of banks  142  141  141 128 125 127
Adj./pseudo R-squared 0.312  0.325  0.325 0.282 0.061 0.190
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Timeline of events and data 
EVENTS 
      MMCB  failure  (Mar  13  ‘01) 
                                               
                      runs                                                                         
                         Mar 9, 12 
         Mar 31 ‘00                       Dec 31‘00                         Mar 31 ‘01                                           Dec 31‘01              Mar 31 ‘02         
         deposit data                   deposit data           data on                                                 deposit data              deposit data 
     balance sheet data                   exposure to  MMCB                             balance sheet data   
                                                               
             deposit  data 
       balance  sheet  data   
DATA
Figure 2a 














































Large Deposit Withdrawals (right scale)
Deposit Growth (left scale)
Figure 2b 
Relationship between deposit withdrawals and exposure before failure of large bank 
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Figure 1 presents the timeline of events and data.  
Figure 2A presents the relationship between different thresholds of exposure with deposit growth and large 
deposit withdrawals. Figure 2B reports the same relationship in the period before the failure of the large bank. 
Deposit growth is log (Dt/Dt–1) where Dt is the level of deposits as on December 31, 2001, and Dt–1is the level 
of deposits as on March 31, 2001. Large deposit withdrawals is a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if 
deposit growth is lower than or equal to –12.75% (which implies that 20% of the observations exhibit large 
deposit withdrawals). Exposure is the credit outstanding of a bank with the failed bank divided by its total 
assets as on March 13, 2001. Dummy high exposure is a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if exposure 
is higher than or equal to 9.21% (average plus one standard deviation of exposure if exposure is positive). 
Dummy medium exposure is a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if exposure is higher than or equal to 
3.83% (average of exposure if exposure is positive) and lower than 9.21%. Dummy low exposure is a dummy 
variable that takes the value of 1 if exposure is lower than 3.83% and higher than 0%. Dummy zero exposure
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